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WHO WILL STOP THE RAIN? REPAIRING THE HOLE
IN THE D'OENCH, DUHME UMBRELLA BY PROTECTING
THE FDIC AGAINST FRAUDULENT TRANSFEREE
LIABILITY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
The banking industry is in trouble. For a multitude of reasons, rec-
ord numbers of banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) continue to fail.1 The failure of 200 FDIC-insured banks
1. In a study conducted by the Corporate Financial Audits, Accounting and Financial
Management Division of the United States General Accounting Office, regulators found seri-
ous internal control weaknesses in the 184 banks that failed during 1987. Regulators discov-
ered that banks often "lacked appropriate policies for loan underwriting and approval, had
poor loan documentation and inadequate credit analysis, or established inadequate allowances
for losses on loan portfolios." Deposit Insurance: Hearings of the Financial Institutions Sub-
committee of the House Banking Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 19, 1989) (LEXIS,
NEXIS Library, Omni File) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Robert Gramling, Director of
the Corporate Financial Audits, Accounting and Financial Management Division, United
States General Accounting Office).
The recent failure of Lincoln Savings & Loan of Irvine, seized by federal regulators on
April 14, 1989, presents a good example of internal control weaknesses. Eaton, Lincoln Exem-
plifies How S&Ls Collapse, Official Says, L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 1989, at D1, col. 4. William K.
Black, regional counsel for the Office of Thrift Supervision in San Francisco, testified in hear-
ings before Congress that a typical Lincoln ADC [acquisition, development, and construction]
loan needed no down payment by the borrower, and included architect and developer fees, in
addition to the cost of purchasing the property and construction. IdL at D9, col. 2. Addition-
ally, Black testified that borrowers were not required to pay off any principal for up to five
years from the date of the loan. Id. "The typical ADC project that sank thrifts," he said,
"was scores of millions of dollars in size .... Yet hundreds of such loans were made with no
loan application, no credit checks, with no appraisal or feasibility study, with no down pay-
ment and no personal guarantee .... ." Id.
Irresponsible lending policies in both the domestic and international markets have led to
the majority of the banking industry's current ills. Hearings, supra (statement of Rep. Annun-
zio). "While thrifts [S&Ls] were making bad loans in the United States, banks were making
bad loans all over the world." Id (statement of Rep. Annunzio). These "bad" loans generally
fall into one of two categories. The first category entails those loans used to finance leveraged
buyouts (LBOs). Id. These are high-risk loans because the heavy indebtedness of the target
company (whose assets are used to secure the loan), resulting from the LBO, often drives the
company into bankruptcy. See, eg., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988) (bank-
ruptcy filed two and one-half years after LBO); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94
Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (bankruptcy filed one year after LBO), appeal granted, No. 89-
5216 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (LEXIS, Bkrtcy Library, Cases file). At the end of 1988, United States
banks had LBO exposure over $175 billion. Hearings, supra (statement of Rep. Annunzio).
The second category of "bad" loans consists of loans made to "less developed countries"
(LDCs). FDIC, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1989) [hereinafter FDIC]. Many LDCs have
problems repaying their debt. Id. at 56. Further problems could result in major losses and
write-downs of the debt (a recognition that a portion of the debt is irrecoverable), thus
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in 1988, with deposits of over $24 billion and assets of over $35 billion,
set a post-Depression record exceeding the previous high of 184 failures
in 1987.1 This was eclipsed in 1989 as 206 FDIC-insured banks either
failed or received assistance. The chairman of the Resolution Trust
Corporation, the federal agency created by the recent savings and loan
bailout bill4 and charged with liquidating failed savings institutions, has
identified 223 troubled savings and loans as likely candidates for federal
takeover.
The high number of insolvent banks and savings institutions reflects
"plac[ing] a strain on banks holding a significant amount of LDC debt." Hearings, supra
(statement of Robert Gramling, Director of the Corporate Financial Audits, Accounting and
Financial Management Division, United States General Accounting Office). At the end of
1988, United States banks held over $81 billion in LDC debt. Id. (statement of Rep.
Annunzio).
2. FDIC, supra note 1, at 8. At the end of 1988, federal regulators had identified 1,406
"problem" banks of the 13,606 banks insured by the FDIC. Id. at 5. "Problem" banks are
those institutions "whose financial, operational or managerial weaknesses are so severe so as to
pose a serious threat to continued financial viability. . . ." Id.
3. FDIC, QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE 4 (Dec. 31, 1989). In contrast, a total of only
566 banks failed from 1934 to 1979. FDIC, supra note 1, at 61. The following table presents
the number of FDIC-insured banks that have failed since 1970, their deposits and assets:
YEAR NUMBER DEPOSITS (in thousands) ASSETS (in thousands)
1970 7 $ - 55,229 $ 62,147
1971 6 132,058 196,520
1972 1 99,784 22,054
1973 6 971,296 1,309,675
1974 4 1,575,832 3,822,596
1975 13 340,575 419,950
1976 16 865,659 1,039,293
1977 6 205,208 232,612
1978 7 854,154 994,035
1979 10 110,696 132,988
1980 10 216,300 236,164
1981 10 3,826,022 4,859,060
1982 42 9,908,379 11,632,415
1983 48 5,441,608 7,026,923
1984 79 2,883,162 3,276,411
1985 120 8,059,441 8,741,268
1986 138 6,471,100 6,991,600
1987 184 6,281,500 6,850,700
1988 200 24,931,302 35,697,789
FDIC, supra note 1, at 61.
4. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501, 103 Stat. 183, 369 (1989).
5. Rosenblatt, Up to $100 Billion Extra Sought for S&L Rescues, L.A. Times, Nov. 1,
1989, at Al, col. 2. The Resolution Trust Corporation created by FIRREA has already seized
283 savings and loan institutions with assets totalling $112 billion. Id. For a year-by-year
breakdown of the rate of federally insured bank and savings and loan failures of the early
1980s, see Note, Borrower Beware: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer
When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 255, 259 n.14 (1988).
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a state of crisis.6 More and more money is required to bail them out.7
Concern has grown over the FDIC's ability to manage this crisis effec-
tively in light of a dwindling FDIC insurance fund.' The insurance
fund's size depends in part upon the FDIC's ability to collect debts from
the obligors of failed banks.9 Due to the FDIC's important role as in-
surer of banks, courts have traditionally aided the FDIC in its attempts
to collect upon these obligations." Specifically, courts bar the use of cer-
tain defenses by borrowers under a body of judge-made law originating in
6. Many banks participate in, among other things, loan syndications and mortgage par-
ticipation agreements, so as to "link their destinies with other institutions." Norcross, The
Bank Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, the D'Oench Doctrine, and Federal Common Law,
103 BANKING L.L 316, 318 (1986). Because of this interrelatedness of financial institutions,
while "[t]he spark that ignites the flames of failure may still be grounded in mismanagement or
fraud, . . . by the time the regulators douse today's fires, they will have ravaged the credit
relationships of banks, businesses, and individuals from coast to coast and, possibly, around
the world." Id. In congressional subcommittee hearings, Representative Annunzio noted that
"[t]he health of deposit insurance goes to the very heart of our financial system." Hearings,
supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Annunzio).
Eighteen days after his inauguration, President Bush recognized the seriousness of the
problem at a press conference: "I have decided to attack this problem head-on, with every
available resource of our government because it is a national problem. I have directed that the
combined resources of the federal agencies be brought together in a team effort to resolve the
problem." H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 304, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 86, 100.
7. The recent failure of Lincoln Savings and Loan of Irvine, California, is expected to
cost the FDIC up to $2 billion alone. Eaton, supra note 1, at Dl, col. 4. The owner of Lincoln
Savings has predicted that the federal bailout of the savings and loan industry will cost more
than $500 billion. Pine, Keating Predicts S&L Bailout Will Cost $500 Billion, L.A. Times, Jan.
15, 1990, at D2, col. 2. Industry experts generally use a lower estimate of $300 billion, a figure
which covers only the cost of dismantling failed S&Ls and paying off depositors; that figure
does not include depreciation of the real estate holdings of those S&Ls. Id. The United States
Treasury estimates initial costs at $157 billion. Id. Congress has recognized that the $50
billion originally authorized by FIRREA will be insufficient and now seeks an extra $100
billion. Rosenblatt, supra note 5, at Al, col. 2.
8. In 1988, the Bank Insurance Fund took a net loss of $4.2 billion, the first such loss
since its creation fifty years ago. FDIC, supra note 1, at 42-43. At the end of 1988, the ratio of
the deposit insurance fund balance to insured deposits was 0.80%, down from 1.10% the year
before. Id. at 74. This was its lowest level ever and represents a 23% decline. Id. at xiii
(Chairman's Statement). Though the banking industry as a whole posted all-time six-month
record profits in the first half of 1989, these record profits do not help the FDIC because the
insurance fund pays for bank failures but does not share in bank profits. Hearings, supra note
1 (statement of Rep. Annunzio). Additionally, the record first-half profits were followed by
two of the worst quarters of the eighties. FDIC, Commercial Banking Performance, Q. BANK-
ING PROFILE, 4th Quarter, 1989, at 1.
9. See Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982). For a discussion of the various factors which affect the size of the insurance fund, see
infra notes 468-70 and accompanying text.
10. See, eg., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 96 (1987); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,
315 U.S. 447, 456-59 (1942); Gunter, 674 F.2d at 868-72; see also infra note 305 and accompa-
nying text.
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D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC. I" The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine states
that secret agreements between a bank's obligors and the bank are unen-
forceable if such an agreement would diminish the FDIC's rights.
12
Congress granted the FDIC even more protection than that conferred by
the Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme by codifying a variation of this
doctrine within the Federal Deposit Insurance Act at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e). 13 Courts also shield the FDIC from various state-law defenses
under another federal common-law doctrine originating in United States
v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 14 which affords the FDIC the status of a holder-in-
due-course. 5 These various litigation "superpowers" are generally
raised by the FDIC as "counter-defenses" to an obligor's "defenses"
when the FDIC brings suit upon an asset of a failed bank.6
Despite these various FDIC shields, recent cases suggest that the
FDIC may still be unable to recover on an asset where it is a fraudulent
11. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
12. I.d at 460-61.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
14. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
15. See, e.g., Gunter, 674 F.2d at 873. Holder-in-due-course is defined by U.C.C. § 3-302
(1987). Section 3-302 provides:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person.
(2) A payee may be a holder in due course.
(3) A holder does not become a holder in due course of an instrument:
(a) by purchase of it at judicial sale or by taking it under legal process; or
(b) by acquiring it in taking over an estate; or
(c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular course of busi-
ness of the transferor.
(4) A purchaser of a limited interest can be a holder in due course only to the extent
of the interest purchased.
Id. Holder-in-due-course status carries with it special rights set out in U.C.C. § 3-305. Gener-
ally, the holder-in-due-course takes free of what are called "personal" defenses, including fail-
ure or lack of consideration, breach of warranty, unconscionability, and fraud in the
inducement. Norcross, supra note 6, at 331. Defenses that may be asserted against a holder-
in-due-course are known as "real" defenses and include infancy (to the extent that it is a
defense to a simple contract), incapacity, duress, illegality of the transaction, fraud in the fac-
tum, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he
takes the instrument. U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (1987). For a discussion of the Kimbell Foods analy-
sis, see infra notes 308-52 and accompanying text.
16. Norcross, supra note 6, at 335.
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transferee17 under the United States Bankruptcy Code.18 In other words,
a bankruptcy trustee may be able to avoid the FDIC's interest in an asset
acquired from a failed bank where the asset was originally fraudulently
transferred to the bank by a now-bankrupt debtor. A strong argument
remains, however, that the Bankruptcy Code shields the FDIC from lia-
bility as a bona fide purchaser for value. 9 Given the current crisis, it is
crucial that the FDIC be invulnerable to fraudulent transferee liability
when suing upon an asset of a failed bank in order to prevent a far-reach-
ing detrimental economic impact.2 °
This Comment traces the birth and development of the FDIC and
the protection traditionally afforded it by courts and Congress. It also
follows the development of bankruptcy law and analyzes the bankruptcy
trustee's powers. This Comment then focuses on the conflict between the
federal Bankruptcy Code and the federal statutory and common-law
FDIC "superpowers," and analyzes how a court might resolve the con-
flict under each of the traditional FDIC "superpowers." To answer the
question whether the traditional protection granted the FDIC can be
consistently extended to fraudulent transferee liability, this Comment
analyzes the policies embodied within the conflicting laws. Thus, the
policy behind bankruptcy law, equitable distribution of the assets of
bankrupt debtors, is weighed against the policy behind the FDIC "super-
17. A bankruptcy trustee has broad powers to recover property of the estate transferred by
the debtor prior to the declaration of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988); Levin, An
Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 174-77 (1979). One
such power allows the trustee to avoid (and ultimately perhaps recover) any transfer by the
debtor which is deemed fraudulent and which was made on or within one year of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 179-83. A recipient of such property would be a "fraudulent
transferee."
18. See Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 97 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)
(FDIC not protected from avoidance of fraudulent transfer of mortgage and note), aff'd, 108
Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). For the facts and holding of Kanterman, see infra notes 182-203
and 232-52 and accompanying text. See also La Mancha Aire, Inc. v. FDIC (In re La Mancha
Aire, Inc.), 41 Bankr. 647, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (FDIC not protected from avoidance of
preferential transfer of security interest); 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) protects from fraudulent transferee liability any "transferee that
takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt in good faith,
and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or ... any immediate or
mediate good faith transferee of such transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988).
20. The FDIC records the funds expended to assist or close a bank as a receivable and
then attempts to recover on the assets of the bank. FDIC, supra note 1, at 45. At the end of
1988, the FDIC'held gross receivables from bank assistance and failures of over $17.5 billion.
Id at 47. It set aside reserves for expected losses due to inability to collect upon assets of the
failed banks of over $12 billion. Id As the court in FDIC v. McClanahan noted, "when the
FDIC sues as receiver, victory for the defendant will ordinarily mean a loss that is borne or
shared by the uninsured creditors or depositors of the failed bank." 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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powers," the protection of the banking industry. Noting Congress' re-
peated efforts to protect the banking industry and the FDIC,2  this
Comment concludes that future congressional legislation to afford the
FDIC the status of a holder-in-due-course would advance Congress'
goals and best protect the FDIC.
II. BACKGROUND
Analysis of this conflict requires familiarity with the FDIC, its pur-
poses, and the powers that Congress vested in the FDIC. It also requires
some knowledge of the bankruptcy trustee's avoidance powers.22 The
following background should provide the reader with a better under-
standing of the protection afforded the FDIC by Congress and the
courts, as well as the conflict that arises between the FDIC and the bank-
ruptcy trustee.
A. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1. The creation and function of the FDIC
In 1933, caught in the midst of the Great Depression, the United
States struggled in dire economic straits.23 "Runs" on banks became
common as "[m]en and women with life savings and business earnings
21. This is evidenced most recently by the federal legislation bailing out the savings and
loan industry. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
22. Various powers are granted the trustee by the Bankruptcy Code to gather certain as-
sets into the "estate" of the bankrupt debtor in order to pay off unsecured creditors. Levin,
supra note 17, at 173. These are known collectively as the trustee's "avoiding powers." Id.
The first is the ability of the trustee to avoid and recover "preferences" given by the debtor to
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). A transfer is a "preference" and thus avoidable if made to
or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of an antecedent debt, made while the debtor
was insolvent and on or within 90 days of the filing for bankruptcy or up to one year if the
creditor who received the transfer was an insider of the debtor, which enabled the creditor to
receive more than the creditor would receive in a liquidation. Id. § 547(b). Another avoidance
power is the ability of the trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers. Id. §§ 544(b), 548; see also
infra notes 149-72 and accompanying text. A third avoidance power is the "strong-arm"
clause. Levin, supra note 17, at 173. This grants the trustee the rights of a judicial lien credi-
tor with respect to personal property, and the rights of a bona fide purchaser with respect to
real property. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988). This enables the trustee to "beat out" security inter-
ests that are unperfected, and property transfers that are unrecorded, at the time of the filing of
the petition. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 314, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6326.
23. The gross national product in 1933 was nearly a third less than in 1929. J.K. GAL-
BRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 173 (1961). The unemployment rate was 25%, with over 13
million people out of work. Id. According to another economic historian, "[Tihe country was
gripped with financial chaos; banks were closing, checks were unpaid. Travelers were left
stranded without ready funds and credit was at a standstill." J.F.T. O'CONNOR, THE BANK
CRISIS AND RECOVERY UNDER THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION 7 (1938).
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deposited in banks stormed doors to retrieve their fortunes before it was
too late."' 4 Congress passed a variety of banking bills25 both as an im-
mediate stop-gap measure to prevent further economic disaster, and as a
method of ensuring a continuing stable economy. Congress created and
financed the FDIC26 as one such measure "to bolster the entire banking
and credit structure" of the United States.27 The FDIC, a federal
agency, acts primarily as an insurer of bank deposits.2 8 By acting as in-
surer, the FDIC ensures the soundness of the United States banking sys-
tem by generating public confidence in banks and the economy in
24. J.F.T. O'CONNOR, supra note 23, at 7-8. A "run" on a bank occurs when large num-
bers of depositors panic, thinking the bank will be unable to meet its obligations. Their fears
become a reality as depositor after depositor attempts to withdraw all of their funds. As banks
do not retain that much cash on hand, the bank soon becomes unable to meet depositor de-
mands, thus fueling the panic. See generally National Radio Address of President Roosevelt
(Mar. 12, 1933) (delivered from the President's study in the White House), reprinted in J.F.T.
O'CONNOR, supra note 23, at 100-04 app. (explaining reasons behind Roosevelt's declaration
of bank holiday on Mar. 6, 1933).
25. Norcross, supra note 6, at 316 n.1. Banking bills passed included the Banking Act of
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.);
and the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a thorough treatment of the measures taken by President Roosevelt
during the Depression to stabilize the banking industry, see J.F.T. O'CONNOR, supra note 23.
26. The FDIC was first created by the Banking Act of 1933, amending the Federal Re-
serve Act of 1913. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162; see also Norcross, supra note 6,
at 316 n.l. In 1950, Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act to set forth the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act separately. Act of Sept. 21, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, 64 Stat.
873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1988)). Unless otherwise noted, all
references to the FDIC will also refer to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC). The FSLIC was created in 1934 as an insurer of savings and loan institutions. Act
of June 27, 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1256, repealed by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401, 103
Stat. 183, 354 (1989). The similarity of FSLIC's role to that of the FDIC led the court in
FSLIC v. Murray to note a "parallel in statutory missions." 853 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir.
1988). The Murray court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine's protection applies to the
FDIC and the FSLIC alike. Id. See also Taylor Trust v. Security Trust Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, Inc., 844 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) (D'Oench, Duhme doctrine protects both FDIC
and FSLIC). FSLIC has since been abolished by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401, 103
Stat. 183, 354 (1989). FIRREA transfers the functions and activities of FSLIC to the FDIC or
one of three entities: The Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Housing Finance Board, or
the Resolution Trust Corporation. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
291, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 86, 87. For further discussion of
the effects of FIRREA, see infra notes 468 and 474 and accompanying text.
27. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(citation omitted). In Doherty v. United States, the court wrote:
The [Federal Deposit Insurance Act] is an elaborate one by which Congress created a
scheme for insuring to a limited extent the deposits of the banks participating in the
plan for insurance for the manifest purpose of stabilizing or promoting the stability of
banks, and to aid the government in its evergrowing financial transactions.
94 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 658 (1938).
28. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
The FDIC insured 13,606 banks at the end of 1988. FDIC, supra note 1, at 5.
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9
Although the FDIC's powers have grown over the years, its role
remains the same.30 The FDIC performs its role by acting in two differ-
ent capacities. 31 First, the FDIC acts in a corporate capacity. In this
role, the FDIC regulates and supervises insured banks, 32 has the power
to financially assist troubled banks before and after they fail,3 3 and in-
sures deposits up to $100,000 per depositor. 4
29. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Annunzio). See also J.F.T. O'CONNOR,
supra note 23, at 25-26. J.F.T. O'Connor served as Comptroller of the Currency from 1933 to
1938, as a member of the Federal Reserve Board from 1933 to 1935, and as vice-chairman of
the FDIC from 1934 to 1938. Id. at i. Of the FDIC's beneficial impact, he wrote:
Experience has shown in connection with the failures of insured banks since the for-
mation of the [FDIC] that no longer does a community undergo convulsive excite-
ment nor do depositors in the affected bank go about with blanched faces seeking to
determine how they will be able to carry on their own affairs because of the bank's
failure. They know that the [FDIC] will move in promptly and make available to
them the total of their funds up to the [statutory] limit and that their business may
move on and that their own financial affairs will not be materially hampered.
d at 25-26.
30. The FDIC is authorized to issue "cease and desist" orders to prevent "unsafe or un-
sound" banking practices. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1988). From 1986 to 1988, the FDIC issued a
total of 356 cease and desist orders. FDIC, supra note 1, at 21. The FDIC can also order the
suspension or removal of any officer or director of an insured depository institution. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(e) (1988). In the years 1987 and 1988, the FDIC brought a total of 98 removal and
prohibition actions involving 108 individuals. FDIC, supra note 1, at 21. Perhaps most im-
portantly, the FDIC can terminate the insured status of any member bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(a) (1988). From 1986 to 1988, the FDIC terminated the insurance of seven banks.
FDIC, supra note 1, at 21. Lastly, the FDIC may "exercise. .. all powers specifically granted
... and such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry out the powers so granted." 12
U.S.C. § 1819 (1988).
31. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865; Note, supra note 5, at 260. These capacities are authorized by
statute. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1988) (authorizing corporate capacity); id. § 1821(e) (authorizing
capacity as receiver).
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1820(b), 1828 (1988).
33. Id. § 1823(c)(1), as amended by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183,
255 (1989). The statute provides:
The Corporation is authorized, in its sole discretion and upon such terms and condi-
tions as the Board of Directors may prescribe, to make loans to, to make deposits in,
to purchase the assets or securities of, to assume the liabilities of, or to make contri-
butions to, any insured depository institution-(A) if such action is taken to prevent
the closing of such insured depository institution; (B) if, with respect to a closed
insured depository institution, such action is taken to restore such closed insured
depository institution to normal operation; or (C) if, when severe financial conditions
exist which threaten the stability of a significant number of insured depository insti-
tutions or of insured depository institutions possessing significant financial resources,
such action is taken in order to lessen the risk to the Corporation posed by such
insured depository institution under such threat of instability.
d In 1988, the FDIC assisted 81 banks at an estimated savings to the FDIC of over $900
million. FDIC, supra note 1, at 7. The savings estimate is calculated through comparison
with the estimated costs if the banks had failed. Id.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1988). Interest accumulation over $100,000 is not covered by
deposit insurance. Lazzareschi, Deposit Insurance Cap Includes Interest, L.A. Times, Mar. 3,
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The FDIC also acts as a receiver of failed banks.35 As receiver, the
FDIC is empowered to give notice of the bank's closing to those holding
claims against the bank, collect upon obligations held by the bank as
assets, enforce the individual liability of stockholders and directors, and
otherwise liquidate and wind up the bank's affairs.36
2. FDIC options as regulator and insurer of failed banks
The FDIC has two primary options when a bank fails, both arising
out of its role as regulator and insurer: (1) liquidation or (2) purchase
and assumption.37 The option chosen will ultimately determine the ca-
pacity, corporate or receiver, in which the FDIC sues upon the failed
bank's assets.38
In exercising the liquidation option, the FDIC becomes the receiver
of the failed bank and sells off the bank's assets.39 The funds generated
are used to pay off the bank's depositors, and the insurance fund covers
any deficiency.' When the FDIC chooses this method, it brings suit in
its capacity as receiver to collect the loans of the failed bank.41
The liquidation method, however, has several disadvantages. First,
closing a bank significantly affects the public's perception of the banking
industry's stability and thus undermines the very confidence the FDIC is
supposed to generate.42 Second, the bank's depositors suffer great incon-
venience; regular banking services are no longer available to them, depos-
itors' accounts are frozen, and checks are returned unpaid.4 3 Lastly,
payment to depositors of the insured portion of their funds may take a
1990, at D3, col. 1. Thus, if a depositor holds as an individual a $5,000 checking account, a
$25,000 savings account, and a $75,000 certificate of deposit, the total amount exceeds the
insurance cap by $5,000 plus any accumulated interest. Id. Depositors are actually covered
up to $100,000 in each of two categories of accounts, joint and individual. Id. Therefore,
accounts held jointly with another are also covered up to $100,000 in addition to the coverage
on accounts held as an individual. Id
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1988) (FDIC as receiver of national banks); id. § 1821(e) (FDIC
as receiver of state banks). Federal statute requires the FDIC to accept appointment as re-
ceiver of a failed bank. Id. § 1821(c).
36. Id. § 1821(d).
37. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865. A third option used by the FDIC in connection with 30 of
the banks that failed in 1988 is the insured deposit transfer. FDIC, supra note 1, at 9. In an
insured deposit transfer, the insured deposits are not paid off directly to their owners but
rather the accounts are transferred to an existing healthy institution. Id.
38. Note, supra note 5, at 260.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988).
40. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
41. Note, supra note 5, at 259.
42. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
43. Id.
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long time, and the uninsured portion may be irretrievably lost."
The other alternative, preferred by the FDIC whenever feasible,4" is
to execute a "purchase and assumption" transaction." Here, the FDIC
operates in both its corporate capacity as insurer and in its capacity as
receiver.4 7 The appropriate banking authority appoints the FDIC as re-
ceiver of the failed bank,4" and the FDIC solicits bids49 from other
healthy banks for the purchase of the failed bank's assets and assumption
of its liabilities.50 Upon acceptance of a bid, the healthy bank purchases
the assets and assumes the liabilities from the FDIC as receiver."
These transactions must occur immediately upon the closing of a
failed bank, in order to preserve the bank's value as a "going concern"
and avoid an interruption in banking services.52 Accordingly, as the
healthy bank may not have enough time to evaluate the quality of the
assets it purchases, purchase and assumption agreements provide that the
44. Id. At the end of 1988, over $580 million of the deposits in FDIC-insured banks were
uninsured. FDIC, supra note 1, at 74. Despite these disadvantages, under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(4)(A), the FDIC must implement a liquidation when the cost of other options would
be higher. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1988).
45. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865. In the years 1986 to 1988, the FDIC arranged 395 purchase
and assumption transactions. FDIC, supra note 1, at 10. Only 38 straight liquidations were
conducted in that same period. Id.
46. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(A) (1988).
47. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865; FDIC v. Ashley, 585 F.2d 157, 160 (6th Cir. 1978) (FDIC
often acts in two capacities simultaneously).
48. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865. For a national bank, the appropriate banking authority is the
chartering authority, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Portis, FDIC's
Powers After a Bank Failure, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 259, 260 (1988). Federal statute requires
that the OCC appoint the FDIC receiver. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1988). The FDIC is required
by statute to accept this appointment. Id. § 1821(d). For a state bank, the appropriate bank-
ing authority varies from state to state. Portis, supra, at 260. Although some states make it
optional, many states require the banking authority to appoint the FDIC as receiver. Compare
CAL. FIN. CODE § 3221 (West 1989) (superintendent may tender appointment as receiver to
FDIC if advisable) with MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.710(251) (1983) (commissioner shall request
that court appoint FDIC receiver). The FDIC must also accept this appointment. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e) (1988).
49. After an insured bank's primary regulator notifies the FDIC of the bank's imminent
insolvency, the FDIC's Department of Liquidation prepares a bid information package for that
bank. FDIC, supra note 1, at 19. This package contains financial and non-financial informa-
tion about the bank that helps the Division of Bank Supervision prepare a recommendation for
the FDIC's Board of Directors as to whether to attempt a purchase and assumption or a
liquidation. Id. This package is also given to potential bidders so they can make an informed
decision. Id.
50. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865. See also Portis, supra note 48, at 261-62. Generally, a failed
bank's liabilities will exceed its assets since it was insolvent when closed. Id. at 261 & n.22.
The FDIC, in its corporate capacity, will pay the purchasing bank the difference in cash to
make the transaction attractive. Id. at 261.
51. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
52. Id.
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purchasing bank may return all assets not of the highest banking quality
to the FDIC in the FDIC's capacity as receiver.5 3 The FDIC, in its cor-
porate capacity as insurer, then buys these assets from the FDIC as re-
ceiver using money from the insurance fund.5 4 The FDIC as receiver
then transfers these payments to the purchasing bank.5 The FDIC, as
insurer, then attempts to collect on these "bad" assets in order to mini-
mize loss to the insurance fund.5" With this method, the FDIC holds the
uncollected loans in its corporate capacity as insurer and brings suit in
that capacity to collect upon the assets.5 7
The purchase and assumption route has many advantages over a
53. Id. at 865. Acceptable assets include the failed bank's cash, its securities portfolio, the
bank building, and portions of the loan portfolio that are not past-due. Burgee, Purchase and
Assumption Transactions Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FORUM 1146, 1154
(1979). Assets which are not of the "highest banking quality" are generally the bank's non-
performing assets. Portis, supra note 48, at 262 n.24. These include assets which are in default
and assets which bank examiners have criticized as having inflated values. Id. At the end of
the third quarter of 1989, the composition of non-performing assets held by United States
banks was as follows:
Non-current Commercial and Industrial Loans 29.5%
Non-current Real Estate Loans 27.1%
Non-current Consumer Loans 5.9%
All Other Non-current Loans 20.8%
Real Estate Owned 16.7%
FDIC, Commercial Banking Performance, Q. BANKING PROFILE, 3d Quarter, 1989, at 2.
To reduce the size of its asset portfolio, the FDIC has recently begun using "whole-bank"
purchase and assumption transactions. FDIC, supra note 1, at xiii (Chairman's Statement).
In a "whole-bank" purchase and assumption transaction, the acquiring bank purchases essen-
tially all of the assets of the failed bank, including its bad loans, at a discounted price. Id. at 9.
Of the 164 purchase and assumption transactions conducted in 1988, 69 were "whole-bank"
transactions. Id. at xiii (Chairman's Statement).
54. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Note, supra note 5, at 259-60. The FDIC has also begun using a modified purchase
and assumption technique which results in it holding the assets and bringing suit upon them in
its capacity as receiver. Norcross, supra note 6, at 350 n.146. In a modified purchase and
assumption transaction, the FDIC in its corporate capacity loans money to the FDIC as re-
ceiver for the failed bank, taking back a security interest in the substandard assets not trans-
ferred to the acquiring bank. Id. Title and possession of these assets are still held by the FDIC
as receiver and suit is brought in that capacity. Id. at 350. The first time the FDIC used this
method, there was no specific enabling legislation. Id. at 348. However, after passage of FIR-
REA, the modified purchase and assumption is expressly authorized. The statute provides:
Any conservator, receiver, or liquidator appointed for any insured depository institu-
tion in default, including the Corporation acting in such capacity, shall be entitled to
offer the assets of such depository institutions for sale to the Corporation or as secur-
ity for loans from the Corporation.... The Corporation, in its discretion, may make
loans on the security of or may purchase and liquidate or sell any part of the assets of
an insured depository institution which is now or may hereafter be in default.
FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989).
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liquidation. First and foremost under this method, the bank never
closes." This prevents inconvenience to depositors and limits erosion of
public confidence.5 9 Moreover, short-term loss to the insurance fund is
minimized and the FDIC avoids having to pay out large sums of cash to
insured depositors.' Finally, the purchasing bank receives a new invest-
ment with little risk and with full recourse to recover on "bad" assets
against the FDIC as receiver. 1
3. The protection afforded the FDIC
a. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC and its progeny
The importance of the FDIC's role as insurer required that courts
enhance its ability to collect upon an asset acquired from a failed bank
where an obligor of the insured bank misled the FDIC as to the true
value of the asset.62 In other words, if the borrower had made some sort
of misrepresentations either to the bank or in concert with the bank to
the FDIC, the FDIC needed to be shielded from defenses relating to the
misrepresentation that the borrower could raise against the FDIC's at-
tempts to collect. The United States Supreme Court created such protec-
tion in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.6
3
In D'Oench, Duhme, defendant D'Oench, Duhme & Co., a securities
dealer, had sold certain bonds which later defaulted to the Belleville
Bank & Trust Co.' The bank did not wish to carry past-due bonds on
its books, so it entered into an agreement under which the defendant
executed notes payable to the bank in the amount of and secured by the
bonds. 65 The bank could then carry the notes on its books as a "good"
58. Note, supra note 5, at 260.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 261.
61. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865-66. A purchasing bank pays a premium when taking over a
failed bank due to the bank's "going-concern" value. Barnett, Horvitz & Silverberg, Deposit
Insurance: The Present System and Some Alternatives, 94 BANKING L.J. 304, 312 (1977). This
premium is subtracted from the cash that the FDIC provides the acquiring bank to make up
difference between the assets purchased and the liabilities assumed. Id. The "going-concern"
value exists because the failed bank already has a deposit and liability structure in place. Nor-
cross, supra note 6, at 319 n.14. The failed bank's existing customers, fully insured, will proba-
bly continue to bank there following the purchase and assumption. Id. Thus, a purchasing
bank "'buy[s]' customers as opposed to paying marketing expenses to attract them." Id.
62. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472-73 (1942) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). One commentator noted that "[e]very dollar recovered from an asset being liqui-
dated by the FDIC reduces the exposure of the [insurance] fund. . . ." Norcross, supra note 6,
at 329.
63. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
64. Id. at 454.
65. Id.
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asset, instead of carrying the defaulted bonds. 6 The receipts given to the
defendant for the notes stated: "This note is given with the understand-
ing it will not be called for payment. All interest payments to be re-
paid."' 67 The purpose of the interest payments, known to the defendant,
was to keep the notes as "live paper."68 The true nature of this arrange-
ment was not apparent to third parties such as the FDIC.6 9
The FDIC, the bank's insurer since 1934, acquired the note in 1938
after the bank failed.7" When the FDIC sued upon the note, the defend-
ant argued that, since it gave the note without any consideration and
with the understanding that suit would never be brought upon it, the
defendant was immune from liability.71 The FDIC responded that the
defendant could not assert these defenses, since the note had been exe-
cuted for the purpose of allowing the bank to misrepresent its assets to
creditors, state banking authorities, and the FDIC.72
The Supreme Court, holding that federal law controlled the FDIC's
rights and obligations,7 3 ruled for the FDIC.74 According to the Court,
certain provisions of the Federal Reserve Act evidenced a congressional
intent to protect the FDIC.7" This was manifested particularly by the
Act's provisions allowing criminal punishment of anyone who "'for the
purpose of obtaining any loan from the Corporation [FDIC] ... or for
the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the Corporation
under this section, makes any statement, knowing it to be false, or
wilfully overvalues any security... " "76
In order to effectuate this federal policy, the Court estopped the de-
fendant from asserting either a failure of consideration or the existence of
a secret agreement that the note would not be enforced.77 The Court
held that estoppel could arise without a finding of a "penal offense."78
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. "Live paper" refers to a banking transaction where the borrower has not defaulted,
and where the bank has not noted the loan as substandard in its financial statements. Nor-
cross, supra note 6, at 325 n.39.
69. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 473 (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 454.
71. Id. at 456.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 459.
75. Id. at 456-57 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 264(s) (1988) (current version at FIRREA, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 961, 103 Stat. 183, 500 (1989) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1007))).
76. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 264(s) (1988) (current version at FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, § 961, 103 Stat. 183, 500 (1989) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1007))).
77. Id. at 459-62.
78. Id. at 460.
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The Court established that "[ilt would be sufficient in this type of case
that the maker lent himself to a scheme or arrangement whereby the
[FDIC] was or was likely to be misled."79
Later cases have expanded the so-called D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
to protect the FDIC from other sorts of agreements, including oral agree-
ments of accord and satisfaction 0 and separate agreements regarding
payment of loan proceeds."1 The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine has also de-
feated defenses of usury,82 estoppel,s3 fraud in the inducement, 4
laches,85 waiver,86 and lack of good faith.87
b. Section 1823(e): Congress' codification of the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
Congress has since codified the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. 88 The
statute provides that for an obligor to enforce any agreement that dimin-
ishes the FDIC's rights in any asset acquired from a failed bank, the
agreement must: (1) be in writing; (2) have been executed at the time the
bank acquired the asset; (3) have been approved by the bank's directors;
and, (4) have been held continuously in the bank's records. 89 As first
79. Id.
80. FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enters., 642 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (FDIC
protected under D'Oench, Duhme from agreement by payee on note not to seek deficiency
judgment against defendant).
81. FDIC v. Sarvis, 697 F. Supp. 1161, 1163-64 (D. Colo. 1988) (court rejected defense of
failure of consideration under D'Oench, Duhme doctrine because "[D]efendant [had] signed a
facially unqualified promissory note subject to an unwritten 'agreement' that the Bank would
pay the loan amount to a holding company instead of to the defendant.").
82. FDIC v. Julius Richman, Inc., 666 F.2d 780, 781 (2d Cir. 1981); Charter Executive
Center Ltd. v. FDIC (In re Charter Executive Center Ltd.), 34 Bankr. 131, 135-36 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1983); FDIC v. Leach, 525 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
83. FDIC v. First Mortgage Investors, 485 F. Supp. 445, 452-53 (E.D. Wis. 1980); FDIC
v. Willis, 497 F. Supp. 272, 277-78 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
84. FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 513 (5th Cir. 1986); FDIC v. Timbalier Towing
Co., 497 F. Supp. 912, 920-21 (N.D. Ohio 1980); British Columbia Inv. Co. v. FDIC, 420 F.
Supp. 1217, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
85. Leach, 525 F. Supp. at 1384-86.
86. First Mortgage, 485 F. Supp. at 453-54.
87. Id. at 453.
88. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
89. Id. The statute (as amended by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183,
256 (1989)) provides in pertinent part:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation in
any asset acquired by it Under this section or section 11, either as security for a loan
or by purchase or as receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid
against the Corporation unless such agreement (1) is in writing, (2) was executed by
the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse interest thereunder,
including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the
depository institution, (3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository
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enacted, however, the statute only applied where the FDIC sued or was
sued in its corporate 4capacity as insurer.90 Thus, the original statute did
not preempt application of the common-law doctrine in situations where
the FDIC sued in its capacity as receiver.91 Accordingly, courts applied
both the statute and the :common-law doctrine in cases involving the
FDIC.92 In 1989,,Congress extended section 1823(e)'s protection to the
FDIC as receiver by passage of FIRREA.93 This amendment, however,
still does not preempt application of the common-law doctrine94 since the
scope and application- of section 1823(e)'s protection differ from that of
the common-law doctrineY~.
institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of
said board or committee; and (4) -has been,, bontinuously, from the time of its execu-
tion, an official record of the depository institution.
Id. -
90. 12 U.S.C. 61923.(1988). Subsection (e) of 1823 previously referred only to the FDIC
in its corporate capacity and courts accordingly restricted its application. See, eg., Gallant v.
Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 97 Bankr. 768, 776 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 Bankr. 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (section -1823(e) inapplicable to actions brought by FDIC as receiver); In re
Selden, 58 Bankr. 667, 677'(Bankr. D.,Neb. 1986) ("[S]ection [1823] deals with the FDIC in its
corporate capacity, not in its capacity as receiver of a state bank."). But see La Mancha Aire,
Inc. v. FDIC (In re La Mancha Aire), 41 Bankr. 647, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (section
1823(e) "designed to protect the FDIC both as insurer and as receiver from the effect of secret
agreements between an insured bank and its obligors"). Congress has since essentially codified
the La Mancha holding by explicitly extending section 1823(e)'s protection to the FDIC as
receiver. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. 1823(e)).
91. It is well settled that the common-law doctrine is also applicable to the FDIC acting in
its capacity as receiver. See, eg., FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1986)
(common-law rule of D'Oench, Duhme applies where FDIC sues in capacity as receiver);
FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enters., 642 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) ("Apart from
the protection against side agreements provided by § 1823(e), FDIC is protected under federal
common law as announced in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC."); Howell v. Continental
Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Both D'Oench and § 1823 have been applied
numerous times to effectuate the public policy interest in not enforcing 'secret agreements'
against the FDIC when it is carrying out its statutorily-mandated duties to protect deposi-
tors."); Sarvis, 697 F. Supp. at 1164 (court barred defense of no consideration through applica-
tion of both § 1823(e) and common-law doctrine where FDIC sued as receiver). For a
discussion of the difference between the FDIC as receiver of a failed bank and its corporate
role, see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
93. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e)).
94. FIRREA's legislative history evidences congressional intent to provide more rather
than less protection to the FDIC. It notes that FIRREA "makes it clear that [section 1823(e)]
appl[ies] to assets that the FDIC acquires as receiver as well as to assets that it acquires in its
corporate capacity. H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 335, reprinted in 1989
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 86, 131.
95. Note, supra note 5, at 271. The protection of section 1823(e) is both more and less
inclusive than that of D'Oench, Duhme. Id. at 271-72. Section 1823(e) is more inclusive, as it
applies to any agreement, whether secret or not, and without reference to the obligor's culpa-
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In interpreting cases in which the FDIC raises section 1823(e), the
Supreme Court has expanded the statute's scope beyond the traditional
protection the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine affords.96  In Langley v.
FDIC,97 the Court held that the word "agreement" in the statute in-
cluded "a misrepresentation concerning an existing fact."98 The Court
reasoned:
[O]ne who signs a facially unqualified note subject to an unwrit-
ten and unrecorded condition upon its repayment has lent him-
self to a scheme or arrangement that is likely to mislead the
banking authorities, whether the condition consists of perform-
ance of a counterpromise (as in D'Oench, Duhme) or of the
truthfulness of a warranted fact.99
The Court relied upon the language of its opinion in D'Oench, Duhme,
and found that where the "maker of the note lent himself to a scheme or
arrangement whereby the banking authority.., was likely to be misled,"
that scheme or arrangement could not be used as a defense against the
FDIC.1°°
The statute's underlying purpose supported the Court's broad read-
ing. The Court noted that section 1823(e)'s purpose is to allow federal
and state bank examiners to rely on a bank's records when valuing its
assets.101 The Court observed that quick, accurate valuation is critical
when the FDIC examines a bank for fiscal soundness and decides
whether to liquidate it or to arrange a purchase and assumption of its
assets.102 A misinformed regulatory decision will undoubtedly be a poor
decision.103 This would be detrimental to the role Congress envisioned
for the FDIC as insurer of the United States banking industry's fiscal
bility. Id. Section 1823(e) is also less inclusive, because it only applies where the obligor
asserts an agreement as a defense. Id. at 272.
96. See Portis, supra note 48, at 264 & n.42.
97. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
98. Id at 93.
99. Id.
100. Id (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 91. When a bank fails, the FDIC's Department of Liquidation conducts a de-
tailed asset review. FDIC, supra note 1, at 19. This is used to provide the FDIC's Board of
Directors with an estimate of the loss that would be involved in a liquidation of the bank. Id.
102. Langley, 484 U.S. at 91. For a discussion of the FDIC's options of either liquidating a
failed bank or arranging a purchase and assumption, see supra notes 37-61 and accompanying
text.
103. In Gunter, the court noted that in making such a decision, the FDIC must rely on the
failed bank's records to estimate the amount of assets that will ultimately prove uncollectible.
674 F.2d at 879. The Gunter court explained that "[t]he [FDIC] can then compare its esti-
mated loss from a purchase and assumption against its estimated loss from a liquidation and
make the statutory judgment required under [section] 1823(e)." Id.
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soundness. '0
c. holder-in-due-course status for the FDIC under
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.
and its progeny
Further protection for the FDIC is found in a body of federal com-
mon law separate from D'Oench, Duhme. Courts in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits have concluded that where the FDIC takes a note in
good faith and without actual knowledge of any defense against the note,
it takes the note free of all defenses which would not prevail against a
holder-in-due-course. 05 Some courts have held that Congress, in passing
section 1823(e), intended to give the FDIC holder-in-due-course status
and have implied it into the statute itself.106 Other courts, though, have
found that although Congress clearly intended to protect the FDIC, sec-
tion 1823(e) does not authorize holder-in-due-course status. 1 7 Instead,
they have gone on to examine the federal common law. 10 8 Although
these courts often rely on the policy articulated in D'Oench, Duhme, the
decisions stem from a different federal policy of enabling purchase and
assumption transactions to be speedily negotiated.109
In granting the FDIC holder-in-due-course status, these courts have
104. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
105. See Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.), 859 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 1988), modified
in part, 868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989); FDIC v. The Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 964 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. dismissed sub nom. Gonda v. FDIC, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins.
Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1518 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Gunter, 674 F.2d at 873; Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d
688 (6th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the similarity of this doctrine with the Bankruptcy
Code's protection of bona fide purchasers for value see infra notes 354-432 and accompanying
text.
106. See FDIC v. Rosenthal, 477 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 733
(7th Cir. 1980); FDIC v. Rockelman, 460 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
107. FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
108. Id. See also Gunter, 674 F.2d at 867.
109. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 775. In Cremona, the court refused to apply Ohio law which
precluded the FDIC from obtaining holder-in-due-course status, as the application of that law
frustrated the objectives of the federal program. 832 F.2d at 964; see also Gunter, 674 F.2d at
873 (claims barred not by section 1823(e) but rather by common-law doctrine protecting
FDIC when it acquires note in execution of purchase and assumption transaction, in good
faith, for value, and without actual knowledge of claims at time of entering into purchase and
assumption); FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying same rule to FSLIC).
The Kanterman court also considered Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.), 859 F.2d 357, 362
(5th Cir. 1988), modified in part, 868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989). In CTS Truss, the court added
in dictum that FDIC holder-in-due-course status with respect to notes acquired in a purchase
and assumption transaction precludes a bankruptcy trustee from seeking to subordinate the
FDIC's claim on the basis of misconduct by the failed bank. 859 F.2d at 360-62. The
Kanterman court noted, however, that "[t]he equitable subordination precluded in CTS Truss
... hardly arose out of a secret agreement." Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 775. Accordingly, the
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held that where application of the state law would frustrate a federal
program's objectives, state law does not apply." ° The leading case on
this subject is United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. "' In Kimbell Foods,
the Small Business Administration and the Farmers Home Administra-
tion argued that federal, not state, law should govern the priority of their
liens." 2 The Supreme Court, noting that it had "consistently held that
federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States
arising under nationwide federal programs," agreed that federal law
applied.'
13
The court in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 114 applied this reasoning in a suit
to collect on a note brought by-the FDIC and rejected the defendant's
state-law fraud claims where the FDIC lacked knowledge of the claims
at the time it was appointed receiver of the bank." 5 The court reasoned
that otherwise, the "result would run directly counter to the policies be-
hind the creation of the FDIC.""' 6 The court in Gunter recognized that
if the FDIC had to consider the possible impact of "variable state law" it
would significantly impair its ability to carry out its function." 7 Other
courts have agreed that the increase in the cost of each purchase and
assumption transaction due to assets that are uncollectible under state
law would result in a "potentially enormous cost to the banking system
as a whole."' 8 Accordingly, the Gunter court gave the FDIC holder-in-
due-course status and protection from the state-law fraud claims." 9 This
Kanterman court refused to consider whether the holder-in-due-course rule did or should ap-
ply. Id. at 775 n.7.
110. See, eg., Cremona, 832 F.2d at 964 (Ohio law precluding holder-in-due-course status
inapplicable); Wood, 758 F.2d at 160 (inappropriate to apply state law if state law prevents
holder-in-due-course status).
111. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
112. Id. at 726.
113. Id.
114. 674 F.2d 862 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
115. Id. at 873.
116. Id. at 870.
117. Id. at 869.
118. Wood, 758 F.2d at 161.
119. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 873. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the FDIC
holding a note in its corporate capacity could almost never be a holder-in-due-course for two
reasons. First, when the FDIC in its corporate capacity purchases notes from the FDIC as
receiver as part of a purchase and assumption transaction, the.notes are generally overdue.
The U.C.C. definition of holder-in-due-course requires that the holder have no knowledge of
default or of any defenses to enforcement. U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(c) (1987). The FDIC would also
be precluded from holder-in-due-course status even without knowledge as the assets are ac-
quired by the FDIC in a "bulk transaction not in regular course ofbusiness of the transferor."
Id. § 3-302(3)(c). For the U.C.C. definition of holder-in-due-course, see supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
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holder-in-due-course protection has since been extended to protect
the FDIC from defenses of usury, 2 ' federal securities law violations,12
waiver,12 2  estoppel,12 1 unjust enrichment,124  and equitable
subordination. 121
As shown above, the FDIC receives significant protection when it
seeks to collect on the assets of failed banks.126 A problem arises, how-
ever, where a debtor has transferred property to a bank where such prop-
erty may be recoverable by a bankruptcy trustee under the applicable
sections of the Bankruptcy Code. The questions that arise in this situa-
tion include whether courts ghould treat such fraudulent transfers simi-
larly'to "secret agreements" under D'Oench, Duhme, thus validating the
transfers; whether section 1823(e) bars avoidance; or whether the FDIC
is a holder-in-due-course under the rationale of Gunter. Conversely,
should the FDIC, when it assumes a bank's liabilities, also be deemed to
have assumed the bank's liability for fraudulent transfers? In order to
answer these questions, some background material on bankruptcy law is
necessary.
B. Bankruptcy Law
1. The, development of fraudulent transfer liability
under bankruptcy law
Bankruptcy law has ancient origins. Since society first used fungible
items as units of monetary measure and began to extend credit, the prob-
lem of insolvent debtors has troubled many commentators.1 27 Modem
United States bankruptcy law can be traced to the laws of various Italian
city-states. 128 Bankruptcy principles of ancient Rome later combined
with the law of other European countries and found their way into Eng-
120. Wood, 758 F.2d at 161.
121. Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d 688, 695 (6th Cir. 1981).
122. FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1518 (11th Cir. 1984).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. CTS Truss, 859 F.2d at 362.
126. See supra notes 62-125 and accompanying text.
127. The Old Testament speaks to the question:
[1] At the end of seven years thou shalt make a release. [2] And this is the manner
of the release: Every creditor that lendeth ought unto his neighbour shall release it;
he shall not exact it of his neighbour, or of his brother; because it is called [the
Lord's release. [3] Of a foreigner thou mayest exact it again ....
Deut. 15.1-3, reprinted in C. CARMICHAEL, LAW AND NARRATIVE IN THE BIBLE 78-79
(1985).
128. Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 241-44
(1918).
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lish common law. 129 These principles eventually crossed the Atlantic to
the United States through colonial adoption of English common law. 130
Bankruptcy laws traditionally were enacted to protect creditors.1 3 1
Without such a statutory scheme, creditors would have incentive to indi-
vidually collect as much as possible from the debtor prior to bank-
ruptcy.'32  Such behavior assures the debtor's ultimate collapse and
ruin.1 33 The equitable distribution ensured by bankruptcy laws is, in the-
ory, that which the various creditors would reach on their own given the
availability of perfect information.13 4  Thus, as Professor Levinthal
noted: "A special process of collective execution is devised, a process
directed against all of the property of the debtor, resorted to for the com-
mon benefit and at the common expense of all the creditors."
'1 31
The most important early English bankruptcy law, the Statute of
Bankrupts, specifically targeted fraudulent debtors. 136 The statute was
mostly punitive in nature and provided that a debtor who committed an
129. Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12
(1919).
130. R. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
COMMUNITY 1870-1930, at 70-72 (1987). In Gardner v. Cole, the court wrote:
But antedating as [the English] statutes do the settlement of this country, and being
mainly if not wholly, declaratory of the common law, which set a face of flint against
frauds in every shape, they constitute the basis of American jurisprudence on these
subjects, and are, in this State, part of the unwritten law.
21 Iowa 205, 210 (1866) (emphasis in original). Congress, in the legislative history of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, noted that the history of present laws governing fraudulent transfers "dates
from the statute of 13 Elizabeth," passed in 1570. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
375, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6331. Elizabeth I, daughter
of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, ruled as England's queen from 1558 to 1603. 18 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA BRITANNICA 343-46 (15th ed. 1985). As monarch, her efforts to keep the royal coffers
filled and thus avoid bankruptcy herself included sanctioning the plundering of gold-filled
Spanish galleons by English privateers. R. ANAND, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW OF THE SEA 73 (1983); see also A. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 40-50 (1988).
131. McCoid, Bankruptcy, the Avoiding Powers, and Unperfected Security Interests, 59 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 175, 176-78 (1985).
132. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6297 ("Without [the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code],
certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property.
Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detri-
ment of other creditors.").
133. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 375-76 (3d ed. 1986). Financial disaster for
a debtor can be caused by creditors who seize assets in order to satisfy debts and "leave other
creditors to worry about the rent." Id. at 375. Judge Posner writes that, "[e]ach creditor...
will have an incentive to be first to get a judgment against the bankrupt, and the race is likely
to drain the company of its assets too rapidly to maximize the value of those assets." Id. at
376.
134. See W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 21-22 (2d ed. 1988).
135. Levinthal, supra note 128, at 225.
136. Statute of Bankrupts, 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 7.
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act of bankruptcy, including flight from creditors or the taking of sanctu-
ary within the debtor's home, "[would] be reputed, deemed and taken for
a bankrupt." '37 The court would seize the debtor's assets and the debtor
would "suffer such Pains by Imprisonment of his or their Bodies, or pay
such Fine to our Sovereign Lady the Queen's Majesty .... ,138 This
statute did not provide for the bankrupt debtor's ultimate discharge to
allow a fresh start, so the debtor remained fully liable until the debt was
paid in full.1
39
The statute particularly protected creditors from fraudulent convey-
ances. Fraudulent conveyances have been roughly defined as convey-
ances which "the object, tendency, or effect of which is to defraud
another, or the intent of which is to avoid some duty or debt due by or
incumbent on the party making it."'"
The English Parliament first addressed fraudulent transfers by "An
Act against fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, & c." '' The Act's declared
purpose was "[f]or the Avoiding and Abolishing of feigned, covinous and
fraudulent Feoffments, Gifts, Grants, Alienations, Conveyances, Bonds,
Suits, Judgments, and Executions, as well of Lands and Tenements as of
Goods and Chattels .... ,142 Following an increase in the number of
bankruptcies, Parliament passed another statute providing for harsher
penalties, in hopes of curtailing fraudulent transfers through deter-
rence. 143 If a court found that a debtor had "fraudulently or deceitfully"
conveyed property of the estate, the debtor would "be set upon the Pil-
lory in some publick Place for the Space of two Hours, and have one of
his or her Ears nailed to the Pillory and cut off."'"
In a famous Star Chamber decision, Twyne's Case,145 the court ap-
plied the English fraudulent transfer statute and found a conveyance
fraudulent under a six-part test.146 The court offered this advice:
137. Id. § IX.
138. Id.
139. Id. § X.
140. D. MOORE, A TREATISE ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND CREDITORS' REME-
DIES § 2, at 3 (1908).
141. Act against Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, & c., 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 5.
142. Id. § I.
143. An Act for the Further Description of a Bankrupt and Relief of Creditors against such
as shall become Bankrupts, and for inflicting Corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts in
some Special Cases, 1623, 21 Jacob, ch. 19. For a discussion of the history of English bank-
ruptcy law, see Levinthal, supra note 129, at 16-18.
144. An Act for the Further Description of a Bankrupt and Relief of Creditors against such
as shall become Bankrupts, and for inflicting Corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts in
some Special Cases, 1623, 21 Jacob, ch. 19, § VII.
145. 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601).
146. Id. at 812-14. The six "badges of fraud" were:
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[A]nd therefore, reader, when any gift shall be to you in satis-
faction of a debt, by one who is indebted to others also; 1st, Let
it be made in a public manner, and before the neighbours, and
not in private, for secrecy is a mark of fraud. 2nd, Let the
goods and chattels be appraised by good people to the very
value, and take a gift in particular in satisfaction of your debt.
3rd, Immediately after the gift, take possession of them; for
continuance of the possession in the donor, is a sign of trust.
And know, reader, .... equity requires, that such gift, which
defeats others, should be made on as high and good considera-
tion as the things which are thereby aefeated ... 147
2. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978148
The Star Chamber's advice in Twyne's Case would still be sound
today under section 548 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 149 which
1st. That this gift had the signs and marks of fraud, because the gift is general,
without exception .... 2nd. The donor continued in possession... and used them
as his own .... 3rd. It was made in secret .... 4th. It was made pending the writ
.... 5th. Here was a trust between the parties... and fraud is always apparelled
and clad with a trust, and a trust is the cover of fraud. 6th. The deed contains, that
the gift was made honestly, truly and bona fide ....
Id. at 814. These badges of fraud were the precursors to today's statutory test for construc-
tively fraudulent transfers. As set out in 11 U.S.C. § 548, a conveyance of property will be
found constructively fraudulent if made for less than reasonably equivalent value and either:
1) was made at a time when the debtor was insolvent; or 2) left the debtor with unreasonably
small capital; or 3) left the debtor unable to pay his debts as they matured. 11 U.S.C. § 548
(1988).
147. Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 814.
148. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). Uniform nationwide bankruptcy laws are promulgated by
Congress pursuant to constitutional authorization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The new
Title 11, the Bankruptcy Code, completely replaced the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544, which had been in effect longer than the three preceding bankruptcy acts combined. The
1898 act was repealed by 11 U.S.C. § 401. 11 U.S.C. § 401 (1988). Most of the new
Bankruptcy Code, excluding specific exceptions set forth in sections 402(b)-(e), became
effective October 1, 1979 for all cases except those pending on September 30, 1979. See
generally Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 275
n.1, 276 n.8 (1980) (setting forth brief history of various bankruptcy statutes). Congress made
major amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 and 1986. R. JORDAN & W. WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY 1 (2d ed. 1989).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). Section 548 is "derived in large part from section 67d of the
Bankruptcy Act. It permits the trustee to avoid transfers by the debtor in fraud of his credi-
tors." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5787, 5875.
Section 544(b) may also be used. It provides that the trustee may avoid any transfer by
the debtor that is avoidable by an unsecured creditor under applicable law. I 1 U.S.C. § 544(b)
(1988). "Applicable law" under section 544(b) has been widely held to include state law. See
4 R. D'AGOSTINO & M. COOK, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 544.03[1] at 544-16 (15th ed.
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allows the trustee to avoid transfers of property where those transfers are
deemed fraudulent."' 0 This power enables the trustee to gather those as-
sets which rightfully belong to the estate and distribute them equitably
among the creditors.15 1 Under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
FDIC might therefore be compelled to relinquish an asset acquired from
a failed bank if the original transfer to the bank were deemed to have
been fraudulent." 2 In other words, the FDIC could thus incur fraudu-
lent transferee liability in a suit by the trustee of a bankrupt debtor.
Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. "I exemplifies one sit-
uation in which banks and ultimately the FDIC may be exposed to liabil-
ity as a fraudulent transferee. In Durrett, the court found that a judicial
foreclosure sale of certain real property constituted a fraudulent trans-
fer.'5 4 The debtor had executed a note secured by a trust deed in favor of
Southern Trust and Mortgage Company (Southern). 155  Southern as-
signed the trust deed to Washington National Insurance Company
(Washington). 156 After the debtor subsequently became insolvent and
1979 & Supp. 1987). The majority of states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (UFTA). R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, supra note 148, at 502. Most that have not yet
adopted UFTA rely upon its predecessor, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA).
Id. Where neither act is in effect, common law or state statute governs. Id.
Usually, the trustee will have satisfactory recourse under section 548 and will not have to
resort to state law. Id at 504. However, invocation of state law may be required where the
transfer was made prior to the one-year limitation of section 548. Id. at 505. Under the
UFTA, for example, a transfer may be avoided for up to four years after the transfer was made
or the obligation incurred, or up to one year after the transfer or obligation was or could
reasonably have been discovered. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 639,
665 (1985).
150. Courts may find a transfer fraudulent in one of two ways. Note, Avoidance of Trans-
fer Section 548, 3 BANKR. DEV. J. 389, 389 (1986). First, a transfer will be deemed fraudu-
lent if made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)
(1988). Alternatively, a transfer will be deemed fraudulent if the debtor received less than
reasonably equivalent value in exchange, id § 548(a)(2)(A), and (1) was insolvent on the date
of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of the transfer, id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i); (2) was
engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to, for which the debtor was left with
unreasonably small capital following the transfer, id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii); or (3) intended to in-
cur, or believed he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay such debts as they
matured. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii). In addition to transfers of property, the trustee can also
avoid obligations incurred by the debtor. Id. § 548(a).
151. Note, supra note 150, at 389. For a thorough discussion of all of the trustee's avoid-
ance powers, including the law of preferences, fraudulent transfers, and the "strong-arm
clause," see Levin, supra note 17, at 173. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
152. See Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 97 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
108 Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
153. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir..1980).
154. Id. at 204.
155. Id. at 202.
156. Id.
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defaulted on the note, Washington instituted foreclosure proceedings.1" 7
The only bid received at the foreclosure sale was equal to the amount
owed on the note, but was less than sixty percent of the property's fair
market value. 
15
The debtor-in-possession 5 9 sued Washington to set aside the trans-
fer of the property (resulting from the foreclosure) as a fraudulent trans-
fer.I The Durrett court determined that the foreclosure sale price was
less than a "fair equivalent" for the transfer of the property and that the
sale was made at the time that the debtor was insolvent.1 61 Because the
transfer had occurred within the necessary statutory period prior to the
petition for bankruptcy, 162 the court deemed the transfer avoidable.
1 63
Accordingly, the court ordered a rescission of the transfer.'6
If the FDIC had acquired such a mortgage from a failed bank and
157. Id. at 202-03.
158. Id. at 203.
159. The Bankruptcy Code allows a bankrupt debtor to function as a "trustee." See 11
U.S.C. § 321 (1988).
160. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 202.
161. Id. at 203-04. The court wrote:
We have been unable to locate a decision of any district or appellate court dealing
only with a transfer of real property as the subject of attack under section 67(d) of
the Act [the precursor to section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code], which has approved
the transfer for less than 70 percent of the market value of the property.
Id. at 203.
162. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may avoid transfers made on or within one
year of the filing of the petition for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). The court rea-
soned that although the actual transfer of title occurred in April of 1969, "'transfer' within the
contemplation of the Act, was not final until the day of the foreclosure sale, January 4, 1977."
Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204.
163. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204. The result in Durrett has been repeatedly criticized by mem-
bers of the real property and commercial law bar. See generally Henning, An Analysis of Dur-
rett and its Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications,
63 N.C.L. REv. 257, 272-83 (1985); Note, The Big Chill: Applicability of Section 548(a)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code to Noncollusive Foreclosure Sales, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 813 (1985).
Under the approach of the Durrett court, any purchase of property at a foreclosure sale entails
uncertainty, as the property transfer might be avoided by a bankruptcy trustee for up to one
year from the date of the sale. R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, supra note 148, at 512. This
reduces both the level of participation and prices at foreclosure sales. Id. The lower price
increases the probability that a court will find the price paid to be less than a reasonably
equivalent value, and the purchased property may be lost. Id. This also limits the ability of
lenders to effectively realize upon their security interests. Id. The Durrett result, however, has
apparently been approved by Congress. In the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress included "involuntary" transfers in section 548. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). Con-
gress also amended section 101(50) to define a transfer as "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or
with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of
the debtor's equity of redemption." Id. § 101(50) (emphasis added).
164. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204.
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attempted to foreclose on the property, a court could impose fraudulent
transferee liability on the FDIC and require the return of the property to
the bankrupt debtor's estate. However, the FDIC would still be secured
and as long as the value of the property exceeded the debt, it would be
protected. A more difficult problem arises where a debtor fraudulently
transfers within the statutory period, not the property, but rather the
mortgage and promissory note.16 5 Section 548 allows for the avoidance
of both transfers of property and the entering into of obligations.166
Thus, if the mortgage is avoided, the FDIC would lose its status as a
secured creditor of the bankrupt debtor.167 More problematic for the
FDIC is that if the promissory note is avoided as an obligation incurred,
the FDIC loses its status as a creditor of the bankrupt altogether.
168
These implications also manifest themselves in surety law.169 Cor-
porations regularly act as sureties for the debts of affiliates, and often
grant security interests in their property to secure the debt.'70 If the
guarantor corporation was insolvent at the time it granted the security
interest or was rendered insolvent by the guaranty and received less than
adequate consideration, a bankruptcy trustee can avoid the guaranty or
security interest as a fraudulent transfer. 7 ' Where a bank that subse-
quently fails makes a loan relying on the guarantor, and the guaranty is
avoided by the bankruptcy trustee, the loss falls on the FDIC.'72 The
FDIC will most likely be unable to collect upon the asset from the actual
debtor because if the debtor were able to pay, the bank would not have
required a guarantor in the first place.
The trustee's power to avoid transfers of this sort is not unlimited,
however. This Comment will analyze possible sources of FDIC protec-
tion outside the Bankruptcy Code, the extent to which they may shield
the FDIC from fraudulent transferee liability, and their underlying ra-
tionale. Also, a limitation within the Bankruptcy Code itself may protect
the FDIC where it has taken over a failed bank and is exposed to possible
fraudulent transferee liability. As discussed later, section 550(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code denies "recovery" by the trustee against a bona fide
165. See Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 97 Bankr. 768, 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)
(transfer of mortgage and promissory note), aff'd, 108 Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
167. See R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, supra note 148, at 546.
168. Id.
169. See Carl, Fraudulent Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 109, 109 (1986).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The FDIC loses its contractual rights against the guarantor, and also loses its security
interest in the property of the guarantor. R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, supra note 148, at 546.
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purchaser for value, even where the transfer would otherwise be avoida-
ble. 173 In some cases the FDIC may be such a bona fide purchaser for
value. 174 The next section begins with a comparison of the competing
underlying policies, and analyzes the various ways in which the FDIC
might find protection.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Policy Clash and Conflict
Today, courts confront a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code's
cause of action to avoid fraudulent transfers17- and the protection af-
forded the FDIC by federal statutes 176 and federal common law. 177 This
conflict actually represents a conflict in underlying policies. Two sepa-
rate federal statutory schemes exist, each designed to protect (at least in
part) a different class of creditors.1 78 The powers Congress has granted
to bankruptcy trustees are rooted in a desire to protect the unsecured
creditors of a bankrupt debtor,179 whereas the powers granted the FDIC
stem from a desire to protect another group of unsecured creditors-the
creditors and depositors of failed banks.18 0
The conflict in policy interests arises where a debtor's fraudulent
transfer is to a bank that has since failed and been taken over by the
FDIC. A decision in favor of the FDIC, protecting it from fraudulent
transferee liability, is detrimental to the interests of the unsecured credi-
tors of the bankrupt debtor, creates uncertainty in lending, and may lead
to a rise in interest rates. 81 A decision in favor of the bankruptcy trustee
173. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
The trustee may not recover under subsection (a)(2) of this section from-() a trans-
feree that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent
debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided;
or (2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee,
Id.
174. For a discussion of the possible application of section 550(b) to the FDIC, see infra
notes 354-431 and accompanying text.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
176. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (as amended by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103
Stat. 183, 256 (1989)).
177. See supra notes 62-87 and 105-25 and accompanying text.
178. Compare II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) (providing for orderly collection and distribu-
tion of assets of bankrupts) with 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-4010 (1988) (regulating depository
institutions).
179. R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, supra note 148, at 27. For a discussion of the rationale of
bankruptcy law, see supra notes i31-35 and accompanying text.
180. Portis, supra note 48, at 259-60. For a discussion of the factors behind the creation of
the FDIC, see supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
181. The bankruptcy trustee will be unable to recover assets that would otherwise be avail-
able for distribution to the unsecured creditors of the bankrupt debtor. As this occurs more
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imposing fraudulent transferee liability on the FDIC further reduces the
insurance fund and may impair the FDIC's ability to act as insurer. This
conflict is exemplified in the recent case of Gallant v. Kanterman (In re
Kanterman).1
8 2
In Kanterman, a bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid as a fraudulent
transfer the debtor's execution of a mortgage on certain real property.
18 3
The soon-to-be-bankrupt debtor, Perri Kanterman, had mortgaged
her house to secure a loan from First Inter-County Bank of New York
(FICB) to Biegen, counsel for her husband's business, Gallant Securities,
Inc. (GSI).'" 4 Biegen subsequently loaned a portion of the loan proceeds
to GSI.185
GSI subsequently defaulted on the note and FICB began foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property.'8 6 Kanterman then filed for
bankruptcy.' 87 Thereafter, FICB failed and was closed, and the FDIC
was appointed receiver.'
The FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, took over FICB's foreclosure
and more often, interest rates in the market may rise. See Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors
Versus Prior Unrecorded Transferees of Real Property: Rethinking the Goals of the Recording
System and Their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 125 n.64 (1988) ("to the extent that
collection is uncertain, interest rates will rise overall").
182. 97 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
183. Id. at 770.
184. Id. at 771. FICB, the bank which later failed, refused to extend credit to Gallant
Securities, Inc. (GSI). Id. at 770. FICB did, however, enter into an agreement whereby it
loaned $265,000 to Biegen, counsel for GSI. Id. Biegen loaned a portion of the funds to GSI,
and used the balance to pay off an antecedent debt owed him by GSI. Id. Although Biegen
thought the loan to him from FICB was to be unsecured, FICB demanded collateral and
subsequently conditioned the loan on the assignment to FICB of a second mortgage on a house
and land owned by Perri Kanterman. Id. at 771. Perri Kanterman was the wife of Donald
Kanterman, who was one of GSI's two stockholders, and its Chairman of the Board. Id. at
770. On October 29, 1986, Kanterman executed a mortgage on the property and a mortgage
note in favor of Biegen for $265,000. Id. at 771. Biegen then assigned these to FICB and
subsequently executed his note to FICB. Id. The mortgage was not recorded prior to its
assignment. Id.
185. Id. at 770.
186. Id. In March 1987, after FICB twice returned a GSI check for insufficient funds,
FICB demanded payment from Biegen for $265,000 plus accrued interest. Id. at 771. Biegen
in turn demanded payment from Kanterman, but to no avail. Id. FICB not only instituted
foreclosure proceedings against the property, but also commenced a personal action against
Biegen to recover on the note. Id. at 772.
187. Id. Kanterman filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Id. The court later converted the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. Chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code deals with the liquidation of the assets of a debtor. I1 U.S.C. §§ 701-
66 (1988). Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code deals with the reorganization of the debtor's
estate without a liquidation of all assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1988).
188. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 772. The New York Superintendent of Banks closed FICB
on March 11, 1988, and appointed the FDIC receiver. Id.
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action against Kanterman. 8 9 The bankruptcy trustee asserted a cross-
claim, contending that the mortgage and mortgage note, were voidable
under New York's fraudulent conveyance law.190 The trustee argued
that Kanterman had given the note without fair consideration and that
the execution of the note and the mortgage rendered Kanterman insol-
vent.191 Another cross-claim contended that Kanterman had conveyed
the mortgage with the intent to defraud her creditors. 192 Lastly, the
trustee asserted that Biegen knew or should have known that Kanterman
was insolvent at the time of the conveyance of the note and mortgage, or
that the conveyance would render Kanterman insolvent.193
The FDIC responded that both the D'Oench, Duhme 194 doctrine
and section 1823(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act1 95 barred the
trustee from avoiding the FDIC's interest in the mortgage.196 The FDIC
further argued that its status as a bona fide purchaser for value protected
the mortgage lien even if the transfer were otherwise avoidable. 197 Fi-
nally, the FDIC contended that FICB was a holder-in-due-course of the
mortgage note, and, under the shelter doctrine,19' the debtor's obligation
189. Id
190. Id. Sections 270 through 281 of the New York Debtor and Creditor Law contain the
New York codification of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED.
LAW §§ 270-281 (Consol. Supp. 1989). Section 276 is similar to section 548(a)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and provides: "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present
or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." Id. § 276. Section
273 is similar to section 548(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Bankruptcy Code and provides, "Every convey-
ance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insol-
vent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made
or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration." Id. § 273. Section 272 defines
when consideration is fair:
a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor,
and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or b) When
such property, or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or
antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value
of the property or obligation obtained.
Id. § 272. Section 275 is similar to section 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code and pro-
vides, "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair consideration when
the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or believes that he
will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and
future creditors." Id. § 275.
191. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 772.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 772-73.
194. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
195. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
196. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 773-74.
197. Id. at 773.
198. See generally U.C.C. § 3-305 & comment 1 (1987) (holder-in-due-course rule applies
equally to any transferee who acquires rights).
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could not be avoided. 199
Kanterman raises all of the factors courts confront in seeking to re-
solve problems in this area: the extent of the trustee's avoidance pow-
ers;2 "0 possible application of D'Oench, Duhme and section 1823(e);20 1
possible holder-in-due-course status for the FDIC;20 2 and use of a bona
fide purchaser for value defense under section 550(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code.20 3 Underlying any analysis of these problems is the concern that if
neither Congress nor the courts protect the FDIC, possible fraudulent
transferee liability will impair the FDIC's ability to perform its role as
insurer.2°  The role of the bankruptcy trustee in the representation of
unsecured creditors, however, perhaps merits equivalent concern.20 5
The judiciary must reconcile the competing statutory goals by de-
ciding to what extent the FDIC should be protected from fraudulent
transferee liability under the Bankruptcy Code. To do so, courts must
determine the relative weight to be accorded the underlying policies in
conflict, paying particular attention to discernible congressional intent.
The federal policy in favor of the FDIC is clear. Congress has con-
sistently emphasized the importance of the FDIC's role.20 6 Courts, ac-
199. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 773.
200. Id. at 777.
201. Id. at 775-76.
202. Id. at 775.
203. Id. at 777-80.
204. For a discussion of the effect of fraudulent transferee liability on the FDIC as insurer,
see infra notes 448-73.
205. One commentator notes that, "[i]n a collective proceeding the trustee, in the name of
order and economy, may act as agent for creditors in asserting the various rights different
creditors have, many of which may overlap." T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 80 (1986).
206. The federal legislation creating the FDIC declares as its purpose: "To provide for the
safe and more effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the
undue diversion of funds into speculative operations and for other purposes." Banking Act of
1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
The legislative history of the 1950 amendments to the Federal Reserve Act note that the
"results since [the creation of the FDIC] bespeak the outstanding record the [FDIC] has
achieved in bringing to depositors sound, effective, and uninterrupted operation of the banking
system with resulting safety and liquidity of such deposits." H.R. REP. No. 2564, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3765, 3765-66.
The legislative history of FIRREA chronicles recent congressional concern. It notes that,
"[c]onsumer confidence in the nation's savings and loan system has been declining rapidly over
the last several months; consumer fears about the stability of the system have resulted in rec-
ord withdrawals." H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 305, reprinted in 1989 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 86, 101. The House Report goes on to state:
Low depositor confidence in savings and loans as evidenced by record deposit out-
flow, the need to combat fraud and insider abuse, coupled with the severe insolvency
of FSLIC, make the immediate resolution of the crisis imperative .... The need for
this legislation is clear. The Administration and the Congress must restore public
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knowledging this, have noted the compelling nature of the federal policy
to promote stability and confidence in the United States banking
industry.2 °7
The Bankruptcy Code embodies equally important federal poli-
cies.2" 8 Without it, creditors have an incentive to attempt to collect as
much as possible individually, to the detriment of the debtor and other
creditors.209 This federal statutory scheme is predicated on collectiv-
ism210 and solving the problem of creditors depleting the "common
pool. "211
confidence in the savings and loan industry .... "Never Again," the theme of the
committee's deliberations, is reflected by numerous provisions of the bill which pro-
vide for the early detection of problems in financial institutions and the prevention of
losses to the deposit insurance fund and the United States Treasury.
Id. at 305-10, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 86, 101-06.
207. See, eg., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 442, 457 (1942); Holt v. FDIC
(In re CTS Truss), 859 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1988), modified in part, 868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.
1989); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1986); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156,
160 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513,
1517 (11th Cir. 1984); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 870 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982); Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1981); Chat-
ham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 972 (1982); First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 562 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); FDIC v. Godshall, 558 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1977); Doherty
v. United States, 94 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 658 (1938).
208. Bankruptcy law must be federal in nature, due to the constitutional limits on the terri-
torial power of state courts under our federalist system. T. JACKSON, supra note 205, at 3 n.4.
The rights of creditors would otherwise be difficult to resolve because a typical credit transac-
tion may involve a debtor residing in one state, owning property in another, and a lender from
a third. Id.
209. Id. Creditors able to collect from the debtor first have an advantage over late-comers.
As one commentator notes: "It is like buying tickets for a popular rock event or opera: the
people first in line get the best seats; those at the end of the line may get nothing at all." Id.
See also R. POSNER, supra note 133, at 375-76. Unfortunately, "[t]his decision by numerous
individual creditors... may be the wrong decision for the creditors as a group. Even though
the debtor is insolvent, they might be better off if they held the assets together." T. JACKSON,
supra note 205, at 12. The aggregate value of assets is often higher when they are kept together
in groups, such as a printing press with custom dies. Id. at 15.
210. "Collectivism" refers to the underlying basis for bankruptcy law, the advantages of a
collective and compulsory adjudication of the debtor's rights. T. JACKSON, supra note 205, at
13.
211. T. JACKSON, supra note 205, at 10-19. The "common pool" problem is the tendency of
each creditor to act to the detriment of other creditors by harassing and attacking the debtor in
an effort to collect more than anyone else. Id.
A typical common pool example involves the hunting of whales. If one person owned the
property rights to all whales, care would be taken to avoid the hunting of them to the point of
extinction, so as to avoid the depletion of the resource and ensure continued financial return in
the future. However, where no single person has exclusive rights to hunt whales, each whale-
hunter has an incentive to kill as many as possible, before others do. See id. at 11-12. This is
highly inefficient and means that "there will be no [whales]-and no money-in future years."
Id. at 12.
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This "common pool" justification, a justification critical to the poli-
cies behind bankruptcy laws, arguably does not extend to the law of
fraudulent transfers.2" 2 Bankruptcy, most notably in the law of prefer-
ences, protects creditors vis-a-vis other creditors.213 In contrast, the abil-
ity to avoid fraudulent transfers protects creditors from actions of the
debtor.214 Thus, it has been argued that fraudulent transferee liability
"does not spring from a need to implement bankruptcy's collective pro-
ceedings," but rather only adjusts the rights of creditors vis-a-vis the
debtor.215
Concededly, it may be more convenient to adjudicate all claims
against the debtor in one judicial proceeding, and therefore the fraudu-
lent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are well placed.216 How-
ever, even though these provisions are found in the federal statute, when
weighing the federal policies behind each of the statutory schemes that
conflict in Kanterman, courts should consider that fraudulent transferee
liability is rooted in a more traditional state-law justification, determining
debtor-creditor rights, rather than the overriding federal interests of
resolving the "common pool" problem found in other Bankruptcy Code
217provisions. ' As one commentator notes, fraudulent conveyance law is
"part of the warp and woof of debtor-creditor relations; in terms of bank-
ruptcy law it should be seen as part of the initial establishment of entitle-
ments, not as something that bankruptcy policy should itself have
anything to say about. '21 1 If so, the overriding federal interests in pro-
tecting the FDIC should prevail over the traditional justifications which
underlie bankruptcy law in general.
The United States Supreme Court resolved a similar conflict under
the Bankruptcy Code in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection.219 There, the Court held that section
212. Id. at 146.
213. Id.
214. Id. This is fundamentally a state-law concern with debtor-creditor relations and the
interests in keeping monitoring costs down to creditors.
215. Id. The argument continues:
[S]ince fraudulent conveyance law springs from an entirely different source, its sepa-
rate existence in a bankruptcy statute is more problematic. It would then need to be
justified on the ground of administrative convenience: that, like claims estimation
procedures, it unified and simplified the rules of fifty discrete states. Yet this justifi-
cation still depends on bankruptcy law's implementing state policy in a rule-oriented
fashion, not deliberately changing it.
Id. at 147.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 146-50.
218. Id. at 148.
219. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes a trustee to abandon
any property burdensome to the estate,220 does not allow a trustee to
abandon property containing hazardous waste in violation of state health
and safety laws.221 Section 554(a), the court observed, was unambiguous
on its face,222 but conflicted with important state and federal interests.223
The Court noted that pre-Code doctrine, for the purpose of protecting
legitimate state or federal interests, limited the trustee's authority to dis-
pose of property.224
However, the Midlantic National Bank holding did not "rest solely,
or even primarily, on a presumption of continuity with pre-Code prac-
tice. ' '225 Rather, the Court concluded that a contrary interpretation of
section 554(a) would be inconsistent with other sections of the Code
which support the principle that "the trustee is not to have carte blanche
to ignore nonbankruptcy law."' 226 The Court also noted Congress' re-
peated emphasis on the importance of environmental legislation, both
state and federal, in protecting against toxic pollution.227 Allowing such
abandonment would be "an extraordinary exemption from nonbank-
ruptcy law."'228 Before this exemption can occur, the Court stated, there
must be an extremely clear expression of congressional intent.229
Similar reasoning should be employed to determine the extent of the
FDIC's protection from fraudulent transferee liability. Like the Bank-
ruptcy Code section at issue in Midlantic National Bank, section 548 is
unambiguous on its face.23° Yet using section 548 against the FDIC con-
fficts with an important federal interest, i.e., ensuring the viability of the
220. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
221. Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 507.
222. Id. at 505.
223. Id at 506-07.
224. Id. at 500.
225. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1032 (1989) (explaining basis for
Midlantic Nat'l Bank holding).
226. Midlantic Nat'! Bank, 474 U.S. at 502.
227. Id. at 505.
228. Id. at 501.
229. Id.
230. Section 548 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud [a creditor] ... ; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and
(B) (i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred or became insolvent as a result... ;
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FDIC. While Congress could legislate which federal policy should pre-
vail, it would seem that Congress, by repeatedly emphasizing the impor-
tance of the federal interest advanced by the FDIC, has acted in this area
with sufficient clarity for the courts to resolve the matter.23 l Under the
rationale of Midlantic National Bank, it would be inappropriate to per-
mit a bankruptcy trustee to undermine the purpose behind the FDIC by
subjecting it to fraudulent transferee liability without clear congressional
intent. The following sections analyze the various ways in which the
FDIC might find shelter from such liability.
B. Does the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine Bar FDIC Liability?
The court in Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman)2 2 faced a
question of first impression: whether D'Oench, Duhme23 3 protection of
the FDIC precludes a trustee in bankruptcy from setting aside, as a
fraudulent conveyance, a mortgage held by the FDIC as the receiver of a
failed bank.234 The Kanterman court noted other courts' application of
both D'Oench, Duhme and section 1823(e)235 to preclude "assertion of
defenses based on separate secret agreements in actions brought by the
FDIC seeking to enforce unconditional notes and guarantees. '236 How-
ever, the court determined that since the FDIC had sued in its capacity
as receiver and had not alleged that it had purchased the mortgage and
promissory note in its corporate capacity, 237 section 1823(e) did not ap-
ply.238 While true at the time of the court's decision, this is no longer the
case, as Congress has extended the protection of section 1823(e) to the
239FDIC as receiver.
(ii) was engaged in business ... for which any property remaining with the
debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
231. See generally FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (reforming savings
and loan industry). In congressional hearings, Representative Leach expressed concern over
the size of the FDIC's insurance fund, noting, "the insurance fund is the last defense protect-
ing the taxpayer from an industry's balance sheets. Once the fund is depleted, taxpayers be-
come liable for all future losses. Therefore, it's imperative the Congress ensure that the fund
has adequate resources." Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Leach).
232. 97 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
233. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
234. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 774-75.
235. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
236. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 775 (citation omitted).
237. Id at 772.
238. Id. at 774.
239. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)). Previously, courts had reasoned that
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In attempting to apply the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, the court
found "contours limiting [the doctrine's] application" primarily to situa-
tions involving a secret agreement.24 The court could find only one case
where the FDIC had sued on a note as receiver and where the court had
extended D'Oench, Duhme "beyond arrangements characterized as secret
agreements." 241
In the case cited by the court, FDIC v. McClanahan,42 the FDIC
sued on a promissory note which the maker had recklessly signed when
blank and had delivered to a man known to have been convicted of bank
fraud.2 3 The Fifth Circuit held that by this conduct the maker lent him-
self to a "scheme or arrangement" likely to mislead the FDIC.24 Simi-
larly, in Kanterman, since the FDIC sought to invoke estoppel in the
absence of a secret agreement, applicability turned upon the defendant's
behavior.24 The Kanterman court started with the proposition that
where the defendant was "wholly innocent and not reckless," D'Oench,
Duhme protection would not apply.246 The court's statement apparently
stems .from the underlying rationale of D'Oench, Duhme, which allowed
estoppel where the defendant "lent himself to a scheme or arrangement
whereby the banking authority on which respondent relied in insuring
the bank was or was likely to be misled.
'247
Following this reasoning, the Kanterman court refused to give the
[w]hen the FDIC is functioning as receiver of a state bank it is not entitled to the
protection of the FDIC in its corporate capacity, acting as insuror of a failed bank. If
the FDIC took over the Bank as receiver, the FDIC merely steps into the bank's
shoes and can only assert the same defenses [as are] available to the bank.
Evans v. Robbins (In re Robbins), 91 Bankr. 879, 888 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (citation omit-
ted). Accordingly, the Kanterman court looked only to the common-law D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 774.
240. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 775-76. The court in FDIC v. McClanahan noted the exist-
ence of these "contours." 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1986). There the court wrote:
D'Oench, Duhme has not been read to mean that there can be no defenses at all to
attempts by the FDIC to collect on promissory notes. For example, the FDIC does
not contend that it could have sued McClanahan on the $86,000 note to which his
signature had been forged. Similarly, where the note imposes bilateral obligations on
the parties, rather than creating a unilateral obligation by the maker to pay a sum
certain, courts have held that the maker may defend himself by contending that the
bank breached its obligations under the note.
Id. The court went on to hold that the defendant was estopped from defending himself on
grounds of failure of consideration, due to the recklessness of his conduct. Id. at 516-17.
241. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776 (citing FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.
1986)).
242. 795 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1986).
243. Id. at 513.
244. Id. at 517.
245. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776.
246. Id.
247. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 460.
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FDIC D'Oench, Duhme protection in the context of a fraudulent convey-
ance by a now-bankrupt debtor.248 This conclusion, the court stated,
rested on the fact that the trustee's right of recovery did not depend upon
the existence of a secret agreement.2 49 The court noted that a trustee's
right to avoid a transfer of a property interest under the Bankruptcy
Code arises by operation of law,25 0 and "not due to an agreement or a
condition to an agreement. ' 25 1  Accordingly, as the trustee was a
"wholly innocent" representative of the debtor's creditors, the court held
there was no support for an application of estoppel to the trustee.252
The analysis used in Kanterman produced a result contrary to the
congressional intent supporting the federal policy enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme.253 This policy em-
bodied a desire to protect the FDIC in both its corporate capacity and as
254 Tercnreceiver, The recent amendment to section 1823(e), extending protec-
tion to the FDIC as receiver, evinces this desire.2 55 Thus, the result
reached by the Kanterman court is insupportable.
As set out in Kanterman, the test to determine D'Oench, Duhme's
applicability has two parts.2 56 First, a court must determine whether a
248. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 777.
249. Id.
250. Id. (citing N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-281 (Consol. Supp. 1989)).
251. Id. This conclusion was echoed by the district court on appeal. Gallant v. Kanterman
(In re Kanterman), 108 Bankr. 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
252. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776. In FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), the court
employed similar reasoning. In Meo, the FDIC sued upon a promissory note it held as re-
ceiver of the failed San Francisco National Bank (SFNB). Id. at 791. The obligor on the note,
Meo (along with three associates), had executed the note to finance a purchase of 1000 shares
of SFNB's common stock. Id. SFNB, however, failed to properly execute the stock order and
instead issued 1000 voting trust certificates in the name of the purchasers. Id. The bank held
these certificates as collateral for the loan. Id. Neither Meo, nor his associates, ever saw them.
Id. Later, when Meo and his associates became concerned with the bank's solvency, they
considered selling their stock. Id. Although Meo's three associates did sell, Meo (unaware of
the misexecution of the stock purchase order) executed a new note for his share of the balance
on the original note. Id
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply D'Oench, Duhme protection to the FDIC and did not
estop Meo from asserting a failure of consideration. Id. at 791-92. The court found that Meo
was a bona fide purchaser-borrower, observing that, "he did not enter into any scheme or
secret agreement whereby the assets of the bank would be overstated; he was wholly innocent
of the wrongful action of SFNB in issuing voting trust certificates instead of common stock
shares ... ." Id. at 792. Thus, D'Oench, Duhme protection, by its own terms, did not apply.
Id.
253. See D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 459.
254. Id. at 457.
255. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1823).
256. See Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 775-76.
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secret agreement likely to mislead banking authorities exists.257 Second,
if there is no secret agreement, the court must determine whether the
behavior of the obligor was "wholly innocent. ' 258 If there is no secret
agreement and the obligor is "wholly innocent," the FDIC may not raise
D'Oench, Duhme.259 As the following discussion shows, the Kanterman
court erred in its application of both parts of the analysis.
1. Are fraudulent transfers "secret agreements" within the meaning
of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine?
The Kanterman court began by noting that section 1823(e) did not
protect the FDIC in its capacity as receiver. 2" However, the court then
went on to apply section 1823(e) by looking for evidence of "secret agree-
ments. ' 26 1 The broader protection which D'Oench, Duhme and its prog-
eny afford the FDIC, however, extends not only to secret agreements,
but also to "scheme[s] or arrangement[s] whereby the [FDIC is] or [is]
likely to be misled. ' 262 The question thus becomes whether a debtor's
avoidable fraudulent transfer could (or should) be characterized as part
of a "scheme or arrangement" likely to mislead the banking authorities.
Where a debtor transfers an interest in property and the transfer is
later deemed fraudulent and thus avoidable, the effect of the transfer is to
mislead the banking authorities, and as such it falls within the rubric of a
"scheme or arrangement" as contemplated by the D'Oench, Duhme
257. Id.
258. Id at 776.
259. Id. The FDIC appealed the decision of the bankruptcy court in Kanterman. Gallant
v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 99 Bankr. 208, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting leave to ap-
peal). The decision was later affirmed in a brief opinion by the district court. Gallant v.
Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 108 Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The district court used the
same two-part test. Id. at 434-35. The court first held that the trustee's claims did not rest
upon any agreement, secret or otherwise. Id. at 434. The court held, "when the trustee is
asserting claims for fraudulent conveyance, those defenses arise by operation of law and not on
account of any secret agreement between the debtor and the bank." Id. While noting other
courts' application of the second part of the test, the court declined to rule as to whether the
debtor had engaged in reckless conduct or whether that conduct could be attributed to the
trustee. Id. at 435. The court's refusal to consider the question was due to the FDIC's failure
to allege any facts on this point in its summary judgment motion. Id.
260. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776. Section 1823(e) now applies by virtue of the amend-
ments contained within FIRREA. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)).
261. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776-77.
262. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 460; see Black v. FDIC, 640 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. Unit B
Mar.) (oral agreement that bank would make construction loans unenforceable against FDIC),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981); Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F.2d 355 (5th Cir.
Unit B July 1981) (oral joint venture agreement that bank would advance obligors additional
funds unenforceable against FDIC), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). For a discussion of the
scope of the statute's protection, see supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
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Court.26 Although the usualpurpose behind a debtor's fraudulent trans-
fer of property is to deceive the debtor's creditors and not the FDIC,2"
the transfer's effect is to mislead the banking authorities. The possible
avoidance of a debtor's fraudulent transfer means that any FDIC reli-
ance on the lending bank's books for the true value of the bank's assets
may be misplaced. The D'Oench, Duhme Court noted that "[t]he test is
whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors or the public au-
thority, or would tend to have that effect. "26 The Court went on to em-
phasize that whether the FDIC was actually misled was irrelevant.2 66
Hence, a debtor's fraudulent transfer, the effect orpossible effect of which
is to mislead banking authorities in the appraisal of the bank's assets,
should accordingly trigger D'Oench, Duhme protection. Such a rule is
consistent with D'Oench, Duhme's purpose-to permit the FDIC to
make accurate appraisals of the value of a bank's assets based on the
bank's records.267
2. Is the obligor's conduct relevant?
Even where a court declines to characterize the debtor's fraudulent
transfer as a "secret agreement" or a "scheme or arrangement" likely to
mislead banking authorities, correct application of the second part of the
analysis will still provide D'Oench, Duhme protection to the FDIC. In
D'Oench, Duhme, the Court focused on the conduct of the "maker" of
263. A fraudulent transfer cannot possibly be characterized as the "ordinary and good-faith
commercial transactions" of which the D'Oench, Duhme Court wrote. D'Oench, Duhme, 315
U.S. at 474 (Jackson, J., concurring).
264. See generally 4 R. D'AGoSTINO & M. CooK, supra note 149, 548.02, at 548-33 to -37
(discussing nature of intent required). Since actual intent to defraud is rarely easy to show, the
UFTA incorporated eleven "badges of fraud" as factors a court may consider. UNIF. FRAUD-
ULENT TRANSFER AcT § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. 639, 652-53 (1985). These "badges" are: (1)
whether the transfer was to an insider; (2) whether the debtor retained possession or control of
the property; (3) whether the transfer was disclosed or concealed; (4) whether before the trans-
fer was made, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; (5) whether the transfer was of
substantially all of the debtor's assets; (6) whether the debtor absconded; (7) whether the
debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) whether the consideration was a reasonable equivalent;
(9) whether the debtor was insolvent or becomes insolvent shortly before or after the transfer;
(10) whether the transfer occurred shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred; and,
(11) whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who then
transferred them to an insider. Id
265. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added). The defendant's conduct in
D'Oench, Duhme proved to have a "direct and independent" effect on the FDIC, thus support-
ing application of estoppel. Id. at 474 (Jackson, J., concurring).
266. Id. at 459. In fact, at the time the defendant in D'Oench, Duhme executed the note in
place of the defaulted bonds, the Act creating the FDIC had not even been passed. Id.
267. Id. at 472 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the note.268 The Kanterman court wrote that in the absence of a secret
agreement, courts should look to the behavior of the defendant.26 9 As
evidenced by Kanterman's facts, though, in later litigation involving the
enforceability of a note, the defendant will not always be the "person"
who originally misled the banking authorities. 270 Even where the defend-
ant is not that "person," however, the policy behind D'Oench, Duhme
still mandates the doctrine's application to this different defendant.
Although in the absence of a secret agreement D'Oench, Duhme
protection is premised on the debtor's behavior, courts do not protect the
FDIC in order to punish the debtor.271 The protection issues, rather, to
ensure that the FDIC can rely on its valuation of a bank's assets.272 In
D'Oench, Duhme, the United States Supreme Court applied federal com-
mon law specifically chosen to further the policies behind the FDIC.
27 1
The Court emphasized that those policies would be furthered only if the
FDIC could "rely on the integrity of banking statements and banking
assets. ' 274 In D'Oench, Duhme, the FDIC sued on a note that was an
asset of the bank at the time the FDIC insured the bank.275 The FDIC
was thus not only deceived "for the single day on which the note was
delivered; [the note's] purpose and its effect were to operate as a continu-
ing inducement to existing creditors, and to those who might become
creditors, to rely on this note .... ,276 In order to defend against such
deception and due to the "comprehensive public character of its func-
tion," the FDIC holds more rights than an ordinary creditor. 7
The policy allowing for FDIC reliance is no less compelling where a
bankruptcy trustee subsequently seeks to avoid a note.278 If the policy
268. Id. at 460.
269. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776.
270. Id. at 773. In Kanterman, the defendant was the trustee of the bankrupt debtor's
estate. Id.
271. In fact, the Court in D'Oench, Duhme noted that obligors have been held liable even
where they "had no positive idea of committing fraud upon anyone.... were very ignorant
and ill-informed of the character of the transaction .... and may not have intended to deceive
any person .... " D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 458-59 (citations omitted).
272. Id. at 472 (Jackson, J., concurring).
273. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
274. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 454.
276. Id. at 472-73 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
277. Id. at 474 n.15 (Jackson, J., concurring); Norcross, supra note 6, at 323-24; Portis,
supra note 48, at 262.
278. The district court in Kanterman noted, before ruling against the FDIC, that the
"trustee's ability to avoid a facially valid mortgage may mislead the banking authorities when
evaluating the credit worthiness of an insured banking institution .... " Kanterman, 108
Bankr. at 435 (emphasis added).
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has any force, it must apply uniformly whenever wrongful behavior in
the making of the note is manifest, regardless of who is later named as
defendant." 9 The D'Oench, Duhme opinion supports this view, as evi-
denced by the Court's focus on the likelihood that the misleading "acts"
would interfere with important federal policies; the Court did not focus
on the identity or personal responsibility of the perpetrators. 280 The
Court emphasized that "it is the 'evil tendency' of the acts to contravene
the policy governing banking transactions which lies at the root of the rule
[extending protection to the FDIC].12 1
C. Does Section 1823(e) Bar FDIC Liability?
As noted above,282 the court in Gallant v. Kanterman (In re
Kanterman)283 refused to apply section 1823(e) because the FDIC had
brought suit in its capacity as receiver. 2 4 However, following the enact-
ment of FIRREA, section 1823(e) is directly on point and should be ap-
plied whether the FDIC sues in its corporate capacity or as receiver. 285
1. Are fraudulent transfers "secret agreements"
within the meaning of section 1823(e)?
When seeking to apply section 1823(e), courts must answer a ques-
tion similar, but not identical, to the one facing courts attempting to ap-
ply the common-law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine: Is a debtor's avoidable
fraudulent transfer a "secret agreement" within the meaning of section
1823(e)?
286
The United States Supreme Court has extended the definition of
"agreement" under section 1823(e) so that it is at least as inclusive as
that under the common-law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.28 In defining
279. The district court in Kanterman expressly declined to rule on whether reckless behav-
ior by the debtor, if proved, could be imputed to the trustee due to the FDIC's failure to allege
such reckless conduct. Id.
280. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 459.
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. See supra note 237-38 and accompanying text.
283. 97 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
284. Id. at 774.
285. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e)).
286. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987) (defining term "agreement" in section
1823(e)).
287. Id. at 92-93. In Langley, the Court wrote: "We can safely assume that Congress did
not mean 'agreement' in [section] 1823(e) to be interpreted so much more narrowly than its
permissible meaning as to disserve the principle of the leading case applying that term to
FDIC-acquired notes." Id. Furthermore, section 1823(e) is not limited to situations in which
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"agreement" under the statute, the Court has attempted to ensure that
section 1823(e) advances its intended purposes.288 One of these purposes,
as noted above,2 89 is to allow the FDIC to "rely on a bank's records in
evaluating the worth of the bank's assets."2 90 Other courts, in interpret-
ing the meaning of the statute, have considerably extended the holding of
D'Oench, Duhme and the protection afforded by the statute.291
The bankruptcy court in Kanterman, however, in a view echoed by
the district court on appeal,2 92 found that a fraudulent transfer could not
be a "secret agreement" since it arose by operation of law and not
through a transaction between the debtor and the bank.2 93 This view,
however, ignored the obvious. The term "secret agreement" must be de-
fined with reference to the purpose of the statute, namely the avoidance
of "a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority... [is] or
[is] likely to be misled. ' 294 Accordingly, the analysis in this Comment's
preceding section, concluding that fraudulent transfers are "secret agree-
ments" which are likely to "mislead banking authorities, ' 295 applies with
equal force to section 1823(e). A court's refusal to extend the definition
in the fraudulent transfer context defeats the statute's goal of preventing
the inaccurate valuation of bank assets.296
a deceptive scheme is involved as it simply disallows enforcement of oral agreements. Portis,
supra note 48, at 264.
288. Langley, 484 U.S. at 91.
289. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
290. Langley, 484 U.S. at 91.
291. See, eg., Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.) 868 F.2d 146, 150 n.8 (5th Cir. 1989)
("holding of D'Oench, Duhme has been extended considerably by courts in interpreting the
plain meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)" (citations omitted)). See also FDIC v. First Mortgage
Investors, 485 F. Supp. 445, 452 (E.D. Wis. 1980) ("Congress, in passing... 1823(e), ex-
panded on the protections afforded to the FDIC by D'Oench."). One commentator has written
that Congress' attempt to codify the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was in fact an attempt to limit
the Supreme Court's holding. Norcross, supra note 6, at 328. The legislative history shows
that the statute's authors never meant to grant the FDIC a position stronger than that of the
failed bank. Id. (citing 86 CONG. Rc. 10,731 (1950) (statement of Rep. Walter)). For a
summary of the legislative history of section 1823(e), see Note, supra note 5, at 275-79.
292. See Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 108 Bankr. 432, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
293. Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776-77.
294. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942).
295. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
296. See Langley, 484 U.S. at 91-92 (purpose of section 1823 is to allow bank examiners to
rely on bank's records). The district court in Kanterman, however, interpreted Langley differ-
ently and narrowed the definition of agreement under the statute. 108 Bankr. at 434. The
court quoted the Supreme Court's language that the "common meaning of the word 'agree-
ment' must be assigned to its usage in [section] 1823(e)." Id. (quoting Langley v. FDIC, 484
U.S. 86, 91 (1987)). Accordingly, the Kanterman court looked for a meeting of the minds
between the parties involved, or some sort of explicit or implicit understanding. Id. Finding
none, the court held that section 1823(e) did not protect the FDIC. Id. at 435.
1310
June 1990] FDIC FRA UDULENT TRANSFEREE LIABILITY 1311
2. Is the conduct of the obligor relevant?
If the trustee's misconduct does not matter (as opposed to the bank-
rupt-debtor's misconduct) when courts apply the common-law D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine,297 the defendant's misconduct should be equally irrele-
vant when a court proceeds under section 1823(e).2 98 A careful reading
of the statute supports this result.29 9 Congress, in codifying the com-
mon-law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine in section 1823(e), eliminated the
need to show any "reckless" behavior or fraudulent intent.3 ° Section
1823(e) instead disallows the enforcement of all agreements that are not
written and created at the same time as the obligation, approved by the
bank's board of directors, and maintained in the records of the bank,
without regard to the culpability of the debtor.30 1
In recognizing a clear congressional intent to protect the FDIC, the
court in Gunter v. Hutcheson 3 2 wrote:
Although D'Oench went no further than to enforce the liability
of one who had "lent himself" to a scheme to defraud, the case
provides a general basis for a federal policy to protect the
FDIC.... [A]lthough both Deitrick and D'Oench required an
element of fault on the part of the obligor, [section] 1823(e),
which was the Congressional response to the D'Oench holding,
eliminated any fault requirement. These events chronicle a
broadening protection for the FDIC founded on federal policies
of protecting the banking system .. .
Congress intended to give the FDIC a significant, rather than illu-
sory, amount of protection by promulgating section 1823(e). 3 ' Accord-
ingly, courts have consistently applied section 1823(e) to block defenses
to FDIC claims, without regard to who is raising the defense.3 15 One
297. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 872 n.14 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982).
298. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988). As the court in Kanterman noted, "[tihe focus under
[section] 1823(e) is merely whether the defense asserted falls within the rubric of 'agreement'
as that term is there employed." Kanterman, 97 Bankr. at 776 n.8.
299. For the text of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), see supra note 89.
300. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872 n.14.
301. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
302. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
303. Id at 872 n.14.
304. Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting River-
side Park Realty Co. v. FDIC, 465 F. Supp. 305, 313 (M.D. Tenn. 1978)).
305. See, eg., Langley, 484 U.S. at 96 (condition to payment of note is "agreement" under
section 1823(e)); Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss), 859 F.2d 357, 361-62 (5th Cir. 1988) (oral
side agreement to extend additional financing), modified in part, 868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1989);
FDIC v. The Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1987) (partnership agreement limiting
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court has held that, "[t]he statutory protection of section 1823(e) shields
the FDIC from defenses or claims raised with respect to 'any asset ac-
quired by it under this section.' "306 Section 1823(e) would thus seem to
bar fraudulent transferee liability.
If the FDIC cannot obtain protection from fraudulent transferee lia-
bility under either D'Oench, Duhme or section 1823(e), it may still find
refuge under a related doctrine of federal common law that affords the
FDIC holder-in-due-course status.3°7 The next section analyzes the ap-
plication of this separate common-law doctrine to the FDIC.
D. Does Other Federal Common Law Bar FDIC Liability?
The FDIC is also protected by a different federal common-law doc-
trine than the one stemming from D'Oench, Duhme.30 1 As noted above,
United States Courts of Appeals in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have concluded that where the FDIC takes a note in good faith and
without actual knowledge of any defense against the note, it takes the
note free of all defenses which would not prevail against a holder-in-due-
course.3° 9 Generally, holder-in-due-course status has been granted to
protect the FDIC from varying state law of which the FDIC is not
aware.
3 10
In extending holder-in-due-course status to the FDIC, courts have
liability of partner on partnership promissory note), cert. dismissed sub nom. Gonda v. FDIC,
485 U.S. 1017 (1988); FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 150 (5th Cir. Unit B
Sept. 1981) (oral agreement for future loans); Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F.2d 355,
361-62 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981) (oral joint-venture agreement); FDIC v. Hoover-Morris
Enters., 642 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (oral accord and satisfaction agree-
ment); Black v. FDIC, 640 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar.) (oral agreement to make construc-
tion loans), cert denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981); FDIC v. Sarvis, 697 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (D.
Colo. 1988) (oral agreement to pay loan amount to holding company rather than defendant);
FDIC v. Rodenberg, 571 F. Supp. 455, 459 (D. Md. 1983) (defense of fraud in the induce-
ment); FDIC v. Kucera Builders, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 967, 971 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (defense of
fraud in inducement); FDIC v. Willis, 497 F. Supp. 272, 277-78 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (defenses of
fraud in inducement, estoppel and waiver); FDIC v. Rosenthal, 477 F. Supp. 1223, 1227 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) (defense of fraud in inducement), aff'd, 631 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1980); FDIC v.
Vogel, 437 F. Supp. 660, 663 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (oral loan commitment); Dasco, Inc. v. Ameri-
can City Bank & Trust Co., 429 F. Supp. 767, 770 (D. Nev. 1977) (oral agreement of condi-
tional liability).
306. Chatham Ventures, Inc., 651 F.2d at 359.
307. See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying text.
308. Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 97 Bankr. 768, 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 108 Bankr. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
309. See, eg., FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) (waiver,
estoppel, unjust enrichment).
310. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 869 (11th Cir.) (fraud), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862
(1982).
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applied the multi-part analysis of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 311
First, the applicable law, state or federal, must be determined.3 2 If fed-
eral law is applicable, content must then be given to that law.31 3
Whether a uniform national rule is necessary rests on three factors: (1)
whether the federal program by its nature requires a uniform national
rule; (2) whether adopting the state law would frustrate the objectives of
the federal program; and, (3) whether adoption of a uniform national
rule would disrupt commercial expectations based on state law.314
The court in Gunter v. Hutcheson 315 considered a claim against the
FDIC of securities violations and fraud on the part of the failed bank.31 6
Applying the threshold inquiry to determine applicable law, the court
found that under D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,317 "federal law con-
trols the rights and obligations of the FDIC .... ,3 1 They supported
this by noting that the FDIC functions to "protect and stabilize the na-
tional banking industry" under a federal statutory scheme promulgated
by Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power.31 9 In order to
give content to that federal law the court considered the three Kimbell
Foods factors and found that a uniform national rule granting the FDIC
holder-in-due-course status was required.32 °
First, the Gunter court held that the federal program at issue, na-
tional insurance of the banking industry, by its very nature required a
uniform national rule.321 Second, the court concluded that there was a
need for uniformity to prevent state law from frustrating the objectives of
the deposit insurance system.322 The Gunter court reasoned that this
need for uniformity stemmed from the necessity for "overnight decisions
in dealing with a failed bank. '3 23 These decisions involve choosing be-
tween a liquidation or purchase and assumption of the bank's assets.324
In the absence of a uniform national rule, the FDIC would be subject to
the "additional burden of considering the impact of possibly variable
311. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For the court's application of the multi-part analysis of Kimbell
Foods, see Gunter, 674 F.2d at 868-69.
312. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 868.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
316. Id. at 866.
317. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
318. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 869.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 868-72.
321. Id. at 869.
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state law on the rights involved" thus significantly impairing its ability to
choose between a liquidation and a purchase and assumption transac-
tion.325 Lastly, considering the third Kimbell Foods factor, the Gunter
court concluded that potential "interference with the federal goals of sta-
bility and confidence in the national banking system" far outweighed the
potential damage to commercial expectations by affording the FDIC
holder-in-due-course status.326 This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the FDIC "carr[ies] a shield no greater than that possessed by a
holder in due course-a much more likely transferee than the FDIC." '327
Does this federal common law apply where a bankruptcy trustee
seeks to avoid the fraudulent transfer of an asset now held by the FDIC?
First, the applicable law must be determined. When the FDIC sues or is
sued in its capacity as receiver of an insolvent national bank, federal
rather than state law is used to determine its rights and obligations.328
Furthermore, where the trustee's right of recovery stems from section
325. Id at 869.
326. Id at 872. Other courts have followed this reasoning with respect to state-law fraud
claims, applied federal common law, and granted the FDIC holder-in-due-course status. See,
eg., FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). In Wood,
the court wrote:
When an insured bank goes into receivership, the FDIC in most cases will in fact be a
good-faith holder of its notes. If the FDIC had no knowledge, prior to receivership,
of defenses to the notes, and if it otherwise acted in good faith, it cannot be said that
the FDIC is not innocent. If it is true that the state's bright-line requirements pre-
vent the FDIC from being a holder in due course, then it is inappropriate to apply
those requirements to a government agency crucial to the existence of the modern
banking system when they are without purpose.
Id. at 160. See also FDIC v. Rosenthal, 477 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (court declined to
use notice under Wisconsin law to strip FDIC of holder-in-due-course status), aff'd, 631 F.2d
733 (7th Cir. 1980).
327. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d at 1517-18. In Gunter, the court expressed doubt that the
"eventuality of a bank failure plays a significant role in the ordinary commercial expectations
of the parties to negotiable instruments." Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872. For criticism that this
reasoning overlooks the true manner in which purchase and assumption transactions are car-
ried out, see Note, supra note 5, at 304-05.
328. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Capistrano Nat'l Bank (In re Hescon Devel-
opers, Inc.), 91 Bankr. 916, 920 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (as
amended by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 209, 103 Stat. 183, 216 (1989)). The statute
provides in pertinent part: "[A]II suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which
the [FDIC], in any capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United
States .... " Id. Justice Jackson, in his concurrence in D'Oench, Duhme, interpreted this
"arising under" language as not being merely jurisdictional, as shown by "the presence in the
same section of the Act of the separate provision that the [FDIC] may sue and be sued 'in any
court of law or equity, State or Federal.'" 315 U.S. at 467-68 (Jackson, J., concurring). He
concluded that the "policy of the federal Act does not seem to me to leave dependent on local
law the question whether one may plead his own scheme to deceive a bank's creditors and
supervising authorities as against the [FDIC]." Id. at 474-75.
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548,329 state law is not incorporated. 330 However, where the FDIC has
become the receiver of a state bank, state law, not federal, may govern in
some circumstances.33 1 Some courts have carried this idea a step further.
These courts have held that since federal law grants the FDIC, as re-
ceiver of a state bank, all "rights, powers, and privileges ' 332 granted by
state law to the receiver of a state bank, the FDIC is also subject to any
state-law defenses that could be asserted against a non-FDIC receiver. 33 3
The conflict between federal protection of the FDIC and the bank-
ruptcy trustee's federal statutory cause of action is most pronounced
when determining the applicable substantive law, as courts are not faced
with the traditional choice between state or federal law.334 The trustee is
not raising a state-law defense. Rather, the applicable federal law, the
Bankruptcy Code,335 explicitly authorizes the trustee's right of recov-
329. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
330. Hescon Developers, 91 Bankr. at 920. Section 548 is a purely federal cause of action
with no "provision making state law applicable under the Code." Id.
331. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (as amended by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 209, 103 Stat. 183,
216 (1989)) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subparagraph D, all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity to which the [FDIC], in any capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise under
the laws of the United States...
CD) any action (i) to which the [FDIC], in the [FDIC's] capacity as receiver of a
State insured depository institution by the exclusive appointment by state authorities,
is a party other than as plaintiff (ii) which involves only the preclosing rights against
the State insured depository institution, or obligations owing to depositors, creditors,
or stockholders by the State insured depository institution, and (iii) in which only the
interpretation of the law of such state is necessary shall not be deemed to arise under
the laws of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added). See also, eg., FDIC v. Leach, 525 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (E.D. Mich.
1981) (where FDIC sues as receiver under state law, applicable substantive law is state, not
federal).
332. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1988).
333. See, eg., In re Selden, 58 Bankr. 667, 678 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986). In Selden, the court
held that the FDIC was subject to a state-law defense that the creditor had permitted the
waiver of a security interest through practice and procedure, rather than agreement or misrep-
resentation. Id.
334. Judge Posner, writing for the court in FDIC v. Braemore Associates, addressed the
determination of substantive law in cases involving the FDIC:
We expressed recently and remark once again our queasiness at being asked to decide
an appeal without being told by the district court what substantive law to apply-
state or federal .... In some cases insistence on an explicit statement of the source of
law would be pedantic, but not here. Maybe the "arising under" language of [section
1819 of Title 12] is just a redundant way of conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts rather than a direction to those courts to create a common law of rights and
obligations of the FDIC; but an unbroken line of decisions beginning with D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, holds that the substantive law to be applied in suits to which
the FDIC is a party is indeed federal common law, not state law.
686 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
335. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
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ery.3 3 6 Moreover, the federal statute itself allows application of state law
under section 544(b)337 in certain circumstances. 338 Thus it might be ar-
gued that the "policy to protect the federal agency from the vagaries of
state law affords no basis to exempt the FDIC from a federal statutory
cause of action, provided to assure equitable distribution of an insolvent
debtor's assets to its creditors. ' 339 Though there may be no need to pro-
tect the FDIC from "the vagaries of state law," a second justification for
protecting the FDIC may be found through application of the multi-part
Kimbell Foods analysis."
As explained by the Gunter court, in suits involving the FDIC, its
national character is best served by a uniform national rule.341 Addition-
ally, the important federal interests in stabilizing the economy and pro-
tecting bank depositors which originally led to the formation of the
FDIC would be frustrated through application of the federal fraudulent
transfer provision."' Under the rationale of the Supreme Court in Kim-
bell Foods, the FDIC should be immune from the application of a law,
regardless of its local or national character, where federal interests are
threatened.3 43 The court in FDIC v. GulfL e Insurance Co. 34 explains
the FDIC's only options:
Were the FDIC subject to these defenses it would have to pur-
sue one of two unpalatable courses. First, it could conduct its
evaluations of the failed banks' assets with its current speed and
detail, but be unable to make the informed judgment that is a
statutory prerequisite to its participation in a purchase and as-
sumption agreement, due to the possible existence of unknown
336. Id. § 548. For a discussion of section 548, see supra notes 149-50.
337. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988). For a discussion of the trustee's ability to use state law
under section 544(b), see supra note 149.
338. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1819, 1821(e) (1988) (authorizing FDIC as receiver of failed state
banks, with rights and privileges state law grants to receivers of state banks, and mandating
that state law be applied); 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988) (allowing trustee to invoke rights of credi-
tor under applicable state law).
339. La Mancha Aire, Inc. v. FDIC (In re La Mancha Aire), 41 Bankr. 647, 649 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1984).
340. See Wood, 758 F.2d at 159 (granting protection to FDIC since contrary holding would
"frustrate important objectives of the federal program").
341. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 869.
342. Wood, 758 F.2d. at 159-60. For a discussion of the reasons behind the formation of the
FDIC, see supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
343. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 869. See also Wood, 758 F.2d at 159-60. For an argument against
granting the FDIC holder-in-due-course status, see Miller & Meacham, The FDIC and Other
Financial Institution Insurance Agencies as "Super" Holders in Due Course: A Lesson in Self-
Pollinated Jurisprudence, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 621 (1987).
344. 737 F.2d 1513 (1lth Cir. 1984).
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claims to which it nonetheless would be vulnerable. Second, it
could evaluate the assets much more slowly and exhaustively,
probing beyond the bank's records to the extent possible, at the
risk of losing the going concern value of the failed bank and the
public confidence that it reflects. Even then, the FDIC might
not be able to form the necessary opinion. Under either branch
of this . . . choice the FDIC's ability to enter purchase and
assumption agreements would be seriously circumscribed. This
in turn would frustrate the overriding policy ofpromoting stabil-
ity and confidence with respect to the nation's banking
system.
345
The federal cause of action of section 548 impairs the FDIC's ability
to carry out its statutory mandate, by making it impossible for the FDIC
to estimate its possible liability in a purchase and assumption transaction
as required by statute.346 Thus, the purchase and assumption option is
effectively foreclosed. 347 This interference is similar to that threatened
by the state-law fraud claims rejected by the Gunter court.348
Lastly, the third Kimbell Foods factor, the impact on settled com-
mercial expectations, must be considered.349 Arguably, the same reason-
ing as applied by the Gunter court could be used in the fraudulent
transfer context.350 In order for the protection of the FDIC from fraudu-
lent transfer liability to disrupt reasonable commercial expectations,
creditors of the bankrupt debtor would have to anticipate the debtor's
345. Id. at 1517 (emphasis added).
346. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(k) (as enacted by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183,
258 (1989)). The FDIC may authorize a purchase and assumption transaction only "if it
determines that such authorization would lessen the risk to the FDIC." Id. Further, section
1823(c)(4)(A) provides:
No assistance shall be provided under this subsection [permitting the FDIC to
purchase the assets of a failed bank to facilitate a purchase and assumption by an-
other bank] in an amount in excess of that amount which the [FDIC] determines to
be reasonably necessary to save the cost of liquidating... [unless] continued opera-
tion of such insured depository institution is essential to provide adequate depository
services in its community.
Id. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (as amended by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, i03 Stat. 183, 255
(1989)). In other words, a purchase and assumption transaction can be entered into only
where it has been determined that its cost will be less than that of a liquidation. Barnett,
Horvitz & Silverberg, supra note 61, at 310. In assessing the costs, FIRREA provides that the
FDIC shall take into account both, "the immediate and long-term obligations of the [FDIC]
with respect to such assistance, including contingent liabilities, and.., the Federal tax reve-
nues foregone by the Government, to the extent reasonably ascertainable." FIRREA, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 255 (1989).
347. See Gunter, 674 F.2d at 870 (state-law fraud claims).
348. Id. at 869-70.
349. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29.
350. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872-73.
1317
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1271
bankruptcy, the fraudulent transfer of the asset to the bank before that
bankruptcy, and the failure of the bank and subsequent seizure by the
FDIC.351 This may be too remote to effect reasonable commercial expec-
tations. 2 Thus, protecting the FDIC from a federal fraudulent transfer
claim, where the fraudulent transfer was unknown to the FDIC at the
time it took over the failed bank, would protect the FDIC from conflict-
ing federal law and promote its express statutory objectives.
A court could conclude that neither section 1823(e) nor federal
common law, under either D'Oench, Duhme or Kimbell Foods, afford
protection for the FDIC where a trustee seeks to avoid a fraudulent
transfer. However, the FDIC might still find refuge from fraudulent
351. See FDIC v. Kucera Builders, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 967, 973 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (reasonable
reliance on state law only altered in extremely rare case of failure of payee bank, default on
note, and need to raise defense).
352. A second argument, beyond the possible impact on settled commercial expectations, is
that protecting the FDIC from fraudulent transferee liability will raise interest rates charged
by creditors. To evaluate this argument entails looking at interest rates on both an individual
basis and in the aggregate market.
The individual creditors at issue are those of the bankrupt debtor now represented by the
trustee. Judge Posner notes that interest rates have three principal components. R. POSNER,
supra note 133, at 180. The first is the opportunity cost of capital, a comparison with what the
capital could earn in alternative investments. Id. The second is the risk premium necessary to
compensate the creditor for the possibility that he will lose his capital. Id. It is this second
component, affected by the creditor's attitude toward risk, that might increase. Id. The third
is the anticipated inflation rate over the loan period. Id. Posner also states that interest rates
will
reflect the risk of default as that risk is estimated when the loan agreement is signed,
but thereafter the [borrower] may increase the risk of default, for example by ob-
taining additional loans not subordinated to the first loan or by transferring assets to
its shareholders without full consideration. By doing these things the borrower uni-
laterally reduces the interest rate it is paying for the loan, a rate negotiated with
reference to an anticipated level of risk that is lower than has come to pass.
Id at 371 (emphasis added). Even with this in mind, it seems too attenuated to think that the
debtor's individual creditors, at the time they extend credit and set the interest rate, will antici-
pate the default of the borrower, the fraudulent transfer of assets to a bank by the borrower,
and the failure of the bank and subsequent seizure by the FDIC.
One commentator anticipates that market interest rates charged by creditors will rise as
"the riskiness of subsequent collection, including the risk of unrecorded transfers, must also [in
addition to secured creditors] affect the price that unsecured creditors will charge in connec-
tion with all unsecured transactions." Schechter, supra note 181, at 125 n.64. This reasoning
is applicable where the trustee, representing unsecured creditors, is unable to avoid the fraudu-
lent transfer of assets now held by the FDIC.
However, if the FDIC is not protected, it would be "amenable to a greater number of note
rescission suits and would undoubtedly lose many more of these suits." Note, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation v. Wood: The FDIC, the Failed Bank, and the Seemingly Insurmount-
able Presumption, 17 U. TOL. L. Rv. 693, 706 (1986). This increased cost would be passed on
to member banks through the form of higher insurance premiums. Id. Banks would compen-
sate by charging higher interest rates. Id. Thus, any increase in interest rates should not be a
factor in deciding whether or not to protect the FDIC.
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transferee liability under section 550(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which
disallows recovery from bona fide purchasers for value.
353
E. Is the FDIC'Protected as a Bona Fide Purchaser For Value Under
Section 550(b) of the Bankruptcy Code?
A trustee's right to recover avoidable transfers is limited by the ex-
press provisions of section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code,354 not by state
law.3 5 Section 550 provides that a trustee may not recover from an "im-
mediate or mediate" transferee of the initial transferee if (1) that "imme-
diate or mediate" transferee takes for value; (2) in "good faith;" and, (3)
without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer in question. 56 If the
FDIC satisfies the elements of section 550, the FDIC could be deemed a
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value, and will have no liability as the
transferee of an avoided transfer.357
Section 550 proves to be similar to the federal common-law protec-
tion afforded the FDIC by United States v. Kimbell Foods Inc.,358 and its
progeny.35 9 Under the Kimbell Foods rationale, courts have held that
353. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988).
354. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court in Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. Euro-
pean American Bank, provided both an example of and the underlying rationale for these
statutorily imposed limits:
If the recipient of a fraudulent conveyance uses the money to buy a Rolls Royce, the
auto dealer need not return the money to the bankrupt even if the trustee can identify
the serial numbers on the bills. The misfortune of the firm's creditors is not a good
reason to mulct the dealer, who gave value for the money and was in no position to
monitor the debtor.
838 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1988).
355. Smith v. Mixon (In re Mixon), 788 F.2d 229, 231 (4th Cir. 1986).
356. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is
avoided under section... 548... of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit
of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such
property, from-(l) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made; or (2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such
initial transferee. (b) The trustee may not recover under subsection (a)(2) of this
section from-(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing
of a present or antecedent debt in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability
of the transfer avoided; or (2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such
transferee.
Id. (emphasis added).
357. See Osherow v. First RepublicBank San Antonio (In re Linen Warehouse, Inc.), 100
Bankr. 856, 860 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (FDIC shielded from liability as good faith trans-
feree for value under section 550(b)). Contra First City Fin. Corp. v. FDIC (In re First City
Fin. Corp.), 61 Bankr. 95, 97 (Bankr. N.M. 1986) (FDIC not protected by section 550(b) as
matter of law).
358. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
359. See FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); Gunter
v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). For a discussion of
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although section 1823(e) does not specifically authorize holder-in-due-
course status for the FDIC, state law that precludes the FDIC from at-
taining this status would frustrate federal objectives and is, therefore, in-
applicable.3 ° Hence, where the FDIC acts in its dorporate capacity
through a purchase and assumption transaction and acquires a note in
good faith and without actual knowledge of any defense, the FDIC takes
the note free of all defenses that would not prevail against a holder-in-
due-course.36 1
While Congress did not enact section 550 to codify this federal com-
mon-law rule,362 section 550's definition of a bona fide purchaser for
value is strikingly similar to that of a holder-in-due-course as defined in
the Uniform Commercial Code.363 Accordingly, section 550(b) may mir-
ror the impact that the Kimbell Foods doctrine has on FDIC liability
under state law with respect to the FDIC's liability under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
1. Is the FDIC an "immediate or mediate" transferee?
To invoke section 550, the FDIC must be an "immediate or medi-
ate" transferee of the initial transferee.3 4 Collier equates this with a
"subsequent" transferee of the initial transferee.3 61 Whether the FDIC is
in fact a subsequent transferee will depend upon the manner in which it
acquires the asset being sued upon, and in what capacity the FDIC is
suing.
366
As noted above, the FDIC may acquire the assets of a failed bank in
two ways: as receiver of the bank or through the arrangement of a
that federal common-law protection, see supra notes 105-25 and 309-53 and accompanying
text.
360. See, eg., FDIC v. The Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed
sub nom. Gonda v. FDIC, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988).
361. Wood, 758 F.2d at 161.
362. The considerations underlying section 550 are the same as those behind the holder-in-
due-course rule for commercial paper (UCC § 3-302) and the bona fide purchaser for value
rule for chattels (UCC § 2-403(1)). Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 892 ("[W]aste... would
be created if people either had to inquire how their transferors obtained their property or to
accept a risk that a commercial deal would be reversed for no reason they could perceive at the
time. .. ."). For a discussion of the rationale behind the federal common-law rule providing
protection to the FDIC, see supra notes 309-27 and accompanying text.
363. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988) with U.C.C. § 3-302 (1987).
364. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) (1988).
365. 4 R. D'AGoSTINO & M. CoOK, supra note 149, 5 550.03, at 550-10.
366. See generally id. 1 550.03, at 550-9 to -11 (discussing protected subsequent trans-
ferees).
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purchase and assumption transaction.367 Both methods arise out of the
FDIC's role as an insurer of banks who pays off the depositors of a failed
bank.
368
Where the FDIC has arranged a purchase and assumption transac-
tion and subsequently acquires a "bad" asset, it sues in its corporate ca-
pacity.369 The method by which the corporate FDIC acquires a "bad"
asset, through purchase from itself in its capacity as receiver, makes it a
"subsequent transferee" since not only has the asset been "transferred"
from the failed bank to the FDIC as receiver, but it has then been "trans-
ferred" from the FDIC as receiver to the FDIC in its corporate
capacity.
370
Where the FDIC acquires assets by appointment as receiver in the
liquidation of a failed bank and sues as receiver, it generally stands in the
shoes of the failed bank.37 1 Thus, the FDIC might not be a "subsequent
transferee" of any assets the bankrupt debtor fraudulently transferred to
the bank. The difference between the FDIC acting as receiver for a failed
bank and the FDIC acting in its corporate capacity was noted by the
court in Evans v. Robbins (In re Robbins).372 The FDIC acting in its
corporate capacity as insurer is more than " 'a successor-in-interest to
the closed bank.' ,373 The court reasoned that under these circum-
stances, the FDIC is entitled to greater protection than when the FDIC
acts as receiver and "merely steps into the bank's shoes and can only
assert the same defenses [as are] available to the bank."374 Thus, the
court concluded, where the FDIC has "purchased and assumed assets of
a bank, it may be able to assert [that] it is a good faith purchaser in its
own right" in order to defend against post-petition avoidance actions by
the trustee.375
"Transfer," however, is defined very broadly in the Bankruptcy
367. For a discussion of liquidations and purchase and assumption transactions, see supra
notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
368. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
369. See Note, supra note 5, at 261.
370. See id.
371. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Capistrano Nat'l Bank (In re Hescon Devel-
opers, Inc.), 91 Bankr. 916, 919 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988). The court in Hescon Developers
wrote: "When the FDIC acts as receiver of an insolvent national bank it stands in the shoes of
the insolvent bank and is required to marshal the assets of the bank for its shareholders and
creditors." Id.
372. 91 Bankr. 879, 889 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
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Code.37 6 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code states that
"transfer" was meant to include any "transfer of possession, custody or
control. 31 7 7 Further, the FDIC as receiver acquires the assets of a failed
bank by operation of law.3 78 Accordingly, where the FDIC takes over a
bank's assets and liabilities as receiver, assuming custody and control, it
is a transferee and should fall within the protection of section 550(b).3 7 9
Additionally, where a failed bank would have been a "subsequent trans-
feree" in its own right, the FDIC as receiver, stepping into the failed
bank's shoes, would also be a "subsequent transferee.
'380
2. Is the FDIC a "purchaser" who "takes for value"?
Section 550(b)(1) requires that the subsequent transferee "took for
value. '38 1 In other words, to meet this requirement, the FDIC must
function as a "purchaser. "382
Arguably, where the FDIC acquires assets as receiver in order to
liquidate a failed bank, the FDIC is by definition not a "purchaser" who
"takes for value." The FDIC is appointed by the appropriate banking
authority and simply manages the liquidation of the bank's assets as pro-
vided by statute.383 The court in Osherow v. First RepublicBank San
Antonio (In re Linen Warehouse, Inc.), 384 however, found that payment
is not the exclusive means by which value can be given, and held that the
FDIC as receiver was indeed a "purchaser for value. '38 5 The Linen
376. "Transfer" is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988) as "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property
377. H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 314, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmIN. NEWS 5963, 6271.
378. The FDIC as receiver is given the power to "realize upon the assets of such closed
bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1988). Additionally, the FDIC as receiver is subrogated, upon
payment to any depositor, to all the rights of the depositor against the closed bank to the
extent of the payment. Id. § 1821(g).
379. Linen Warehouse, 100 Bankr. at 859. See also Holt v. FDIC (In re Instrument Sales &
Serv., Inc.), 99 Bankr. 742, 746 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) (FDIC is subsequent transferee
under section 550). Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Bonded Fin. Sers., took a more restrictive view. 838 F.2d at 893. After noting that the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not define "transferee" and the lack of legislative history on the point, he
concluded that the minimum requirement of status as a "transferee" is "dominion over the
money or other asset, [and] the right to put the money to one's own purpose." Id.
380. One example is where the failed bank held a mortgage that had been assigned to it
from another financial institution.
381. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (1988).
382. Bonded Fin. Serys., 838 F.2d at 897.
383. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)-(e) (1988).
384. 100 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
385. Id. at 859.
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Warehouse court pointed out that "value given" could also entail the
rendering of services or the assumption of liabilities.38 6 The court ruled
that the FDIC "takes for value" when it accepts the assets and liabilities
of a failed bank as receiver, and performs "the FDIC's attendant duties,
in accordance with the statutory banking insurance scheme."
387
This expansive interpretation of "value" is in accord with the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which provides that "value" is "any considera-
tion sufficient to support a simple contract., 388  Thus, "value" need
merely be a "cent or pepper corn. 38 9 The amount of value given is im-
material. Unlike prior law, section 550 imposes no requirement that the
value given by the transferee, the FDIC in its corporate capacity, be a
fair equivalent to the value of the property transferred.390 Furthermore,
the Linen Warehouse court's interpretation of "value" is in accord with
congressional objectives in FIRREA, the 1989 reformation of banking
industry regulation. 91
Is the FDIC a "purchaser" for value when it sues in its corporate
capacity? The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in Bonded
Financial Services v. European American Bank,392 that the federal statute
does not say "value to the debtor," but rather, "value. 3 93 Since the
FDIC acts in its corporate capacity to give value to the FDIC as receiver
in return for assets, it could also be viewed as a "purchaser" as the term
is used in section 550.
It has been argued, however, that when the FDIC as receiver trans-
386. Id.
387. i l
388. U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(d) (1987).
389. Whitney v. Steams, 16 Me. 394, 397 (1839).
390. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67(e), 30 Stat. 544 (requiring both good faith
and "present fair consideration").
391. Congressional objectives were laid out in the recent savings and loan bailout bill, FIR-
REA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101, 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989). The Act was designed to: (1)
promote a safe and stable system of affordable housing finance through regulatory reform; (2)
improve the supervision of the savings and loan industry; (3) curtail risky investments by
S&Ls; (4) promote the independence of the FDIC; (5) ensure the solvency of federal deposit
insurance funds; (6) establish an Office of Thrift Supervision; (7) establish the Resolution Trust
Corporation to contain, manage and resolve failed S&Ls; (8) provide public and private funds
to handle failed S&Ls; (9) strengthen the FDIC's enforcement powers; and, (10) strengthen
civil and criminal penalties for defrauding depository institutions and their depositors. Id.
§ 101.
392. 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
393. Id. at 897. The court further noted that "[a] natural reading [of the statute] looks to
what the transferee gave up rather than what the debtor received." Id. See also 11 U.S.C.
550(b)(1) (1988) ("The trustee may not recover... from-a transferee that takes for value,
including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided .... ").
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fers an asset to itself in its corporate capacity, the FDIC is not a "pur-
chaser" at all because it receives the asset from itself.394 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals answered this question in FDIC v. Ashley,
39 5
holding that the fact that the FDIC purchases the asset from itself
presents no problem.396
In Ashley, the FDIC had been appointed receiver of the Tri-City
Bank of Warren, Michigan.397 The "unacceptable assets" of the bank,
including certain causes of action, were subsequently assigned for value
to the FDIC in its corporate capacity.398 When the FDIC in its corpo-
rate capacity brought suit against the directors of the bank for corporate
mismanagement and waste, the bank directors claimed that the transfer
of the causes of action was a sham.399 The Ashley court held that the
validity of the FDIC as a purchaser of assets in its corporate capacity
does not change merely because the FDIC, as appointed receiver of the
bank, also acts as the seller.4° The court based its holding on a reading
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act4' which provides that the FDIC
may, and often must, act in two capacities simultaneously, those of a
"'receiver of a bank and as an insurance corporation.' ,0 Accordingly,
where the FDIC in its corporate capacity purchases assets from itself in
its capacity as receiver, it qualifies as a "purchaser" who "takes for
value. ,
,403
3. Is the FDIC acting in "good faith"?
The next question is whether the FDIC acquired the asset upon
which it is suing in "good faith."' ' What this means, however, is un-
clear, as the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "good faith.""
Collier," 6 however, notes that courts have defined "good faith"
394. FDIC v. Ashley, 585 F.2d 157, 160 (6th Cir. 1978).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 158.
398. Id. at 159-60.
399. Id. at 160.
400. Id.
401. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1988).
402. Ashley, 585 F.2d at 160 (emphasis added) (quoting FDIC v. Godshall, 558 F.2d 220,
223 (4th Cir. 1977)).
403. Id.
404. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
405. 4 R. D'AGoSTNO & M. COOK, supra note 149, 1 550.03, at 550-9.
406. The first edition of Collier on Bankruptcy was published in 1898 upon passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of that same year. 1 R. BABIT, R. BROUDE & A. HERZOG, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY xiii (15th ed. 1979). Now, more than 90 years later, it is in its fifteenth edition
and is recognized as "the foremost authority on the subject of bankruptcy." Id.
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under prior law." 7 Generally, the determinative inquiry by the courts is
whether the transferee knew or should have known that he or she was
not engaged in a normal transaction but rather one in which the debtor
intended to defraud his creditors." 5 In Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v.
European American Bank," 9 Judge Easterbrook recognized that
"[v]enerable authority has it that the recipient of a voidable transfer may
lack good faith if he possessed enough knowledge of the events to induce
a reasonable person to investigate."41
Congress attempted to explain its use of the phrase "good faith," but
the legislative history of section 550 is not particularly helpful.4 1 1 Con-
gress explained that:
The phrase "good faith" in this paragraph is intended to pre-
vent a transferee from whom the trustee could recover from
transferring the recoverable property to an innocent transferee,
and receiving a retransfer from him, that is, "washing" the
transaction through an innocent third party. In order for the
transferee to be excepted from liability under this paragraph, he
himself must be a good faith transferee.412
The notes that accompanied the proposed statute of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States are no more helpful. The
notes state that "good faith" is a familiar phrase that courts can best
interpret on a case-by-case basis.413 Consequently, courts have had little
guidance in applying "good faith" to FDIC actions.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in FDIC v. Wood 414 held that
where the FDIC in its corporate capacity brings suit on a note, a pre-
sumption of "good faith" exists.415 The court reasoned that if the FDIC
lacked knowledge of defenses to the notes prior to receivership, then "it
cannot be said that the FDIC is not innocent." '4 16 The court explained
407. 4 R. D'AGOSTINO & M. COOK, supra note 149, 1 550.03, at 550-9 & n.3. "[T]he good
faith to be considered is that of the transferee and not the intent of the transferor." Id. at
550.03, at 550-9 n.3.
408. Id. (citing In re Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1940)).
409. 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
410. Id. at 897-98. See Dokken v. Page, 147 F. 438, 441-42 (8th Cir. 1906) (lack of good
faith where knowledge that debtor was transferring almost all assets).
411. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5876.
412. Id.
413. COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., PART II, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 180,
para. 4 (1973).
414. 758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
415. Id. at 162.
416. Id. The court went on to grant the FDIC holder-in-due-course status, and thus pro-
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that while the FDIC in its corporate capacity may be aware of the note's
potential avoidability at the time the FDIC purchases the note from itself
as receiver, that knowledge did not necessarily exist when the FDIC orig-
inally acquired the note. 17 Courts have extended the Wood court's rea-
soning to the FDIC bringing suit as receiver and have also found "good
faith" under these circumstances.41 These decisions finding that the
FDIC acted in "good faith," implicitly recognize that the FDIC may
have knowledge of potential avoidability at the time the asset is trans-
ferred to the corporate FDIC. They nevertheless find that application of
a strict interpretation of "good faith" to the FDIC seems inappropriate,
due to the FDIC's role as a "government agency crucial to the existence
of the modem banking system .... 419
4. Does the FDIC have "knowledge of the voidability
of the transfer"?
Finally, section 550(b) requires that a transferee be without "knowl-
edge of the voidability of the transfer avoided .... 42  Courts interpret
this requirement as meaning actual "knowledge" as opposed to "con-
structive notice" of the voidability of the transfer. 421 The court in Wood
declared that the FDIC is "under no duty, in either of its capacities, to
examine the assets of a failed bank before it agrees to execute a purchase
and assumption transaction. 4 22 This approach precludes charging the
FDIC with constructive knowledge of a defense just because that infor-
mation could be found in the bank's files.423
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Bonded Financial Services, concluded that a lesser amount of knowl-
tection, under the Kimbell Foods common-law doctrine. Id. at 161. For a discussion of the
Kimbell Foods line of cases and their possible applicability to fraudulent transfers, see supra
notes 105-25 and 308-52 and accompanying text. See also Gunter, 674 F.2d at 873-74 (FDIC
acts in good faith where it acquires note from itself as receiver); Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d
688, 695 n.11 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing FDIC v. Ashley, 585 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1978)) (sale of
note from FDIC as receiver to FDIC as corporate insurer is "intra-FDIC transaction" and
satisfies good faith criterion of innocent-purchaser defense of section 29(c) of Security Ex-
change Act of 1934).
417. Wood, 758 F.2d at 162. The court wrote, "our explicit holding... [is] that the FDIC
is under no duty, in either of its capacities, to examine the assets of a failed bank before it
agrees to execute a purchase and assumption transaction." Id.
418. See Linen Warehouse, 100 Bankr. at 859.
419. Wood, 758 F.2d at 160.
420. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988).
421. Mixon, 788 F.2d at 232.
422. Wood, 758 F.2d at 162.
423. Id.
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edge would defeat a section 550(b) defense under the Code.4 24 Noting
that while requiring "receipt of a lawyer's opinion that such a transfer is
voidable" is too strict a standard, he suggests that some knowledge less
than actual knowledge will do.42 However, he declines to impose a duty
to investigate as the transferee need not be a "monitor for [the] creditors'
benefit when nothing known so far suggests that there is a fraudulent
conveyance in the chain.
426
Collier treats the "without knowledge" requirement as redundant
when taken in conjunction with the "good faith" requirement, and most
courts have agreed.427 Collier explains that the "knowledge" language
was derived from section 4-609(b)(1) of the draft statute filed with Con-
gress42 by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States.429 The phrase was included solely as an illustration of a trans-
feree who could not have taken in "good faith."'43 Collier's interpreta-
tion makes it easier for the FDIC to claim status as a bona fide purchaser
for value, a result in accord with Congress' efforts to protect the
FDIC.431
A court deciding possible FDIC fraudulent transferee liability must
carefully evaluate each of the issues discussed above. The court, after
finding a fraudulent transfer, must in turn consider whether the FDIC is
protected by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, section 1823(e), federal com-
mon law, or federal statute (as a bona fide purchaser for value). Each
step in this process presents an opportunity for the court to manipulate
the analysis to protect the FDIC and many courts have done So.432
424. Bonded Fin. Sers., 838 F.2d at 898.
425. Id. Judge Easterbrook writes: "Some facts strongly suggest the presence of others; a
recipient that closes its eyes to the remaining facts may not deny knowledge." Id. See
Federman v. Falcone (In re Nevada Implement Co.), 22 Bankr. 105, 106 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1982) (knowledge of voidability does not mean complete understanding of all facts; lesser
knowledge will do).
426. Bonded Fin. Sers., 838 F.2d at 898.
427. See 4 R. D'AGOSTINO & M. CooK, supra note 149, 1 550.03, at 550-10; Countryman,
The Trustee's Recovery in Preference Actions, 3 BANKR. DEv. J. 449, 475-482 (1986) (courts
need not attempt to discern difference). See also, eg., Holt v. FDIC (In re Instrument Sales &
Serv.), 99 Bankr. 742, 745-46 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987).
428. 4 R. D'AGOSTINO & M. COOK, supra note 149, 550.03, at 550-10. The Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States filed a proposed statute in 1973. See H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 11 (1973). This proposed statute was accompanied by de-
tailed notes interpreting its provisions. Id. However, the proposed statute, introduced in the
ninety-third Congress as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, did not have accompanying notes. Id.
429. 4 R. D'AGOSTINO & M. COOK, supra note 149, % 550.03, at 550-10 n.4.
430. Id.
431. For the purposes behind the passage of FIRREA, see supra note 391.
432. The following cases provided protection to the FDIC. See, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484
U.S. 86, 96 (1987) (FDIC protected from defense of failure of condition to payment of note);
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While the results in these cases are supportable, it can be argued that
courts need not engage in such manipulation because subjecting the
FDIC to fraudulent transferee liability will not prevent the FDIC from
carrying out its statutory duties. The next section evaluates this
argument.
F Do Fraudulent Transfers Somehow Differ from Secret Agreements?
Arguably, the policy behind protecting the FDIC from secret agree-
ments should not be extended to protecting the FDIC from fraudulent
transferee liability if there is a fundamental difference in the way fraudu-
lent transfers and secret agreements impact the FDIC.4 33 In particular,
while secret agreements affect the FDIC's role as both regulator and in-
surer, fraudulent transferee liability may not. To evaluate the soundness
of such an argument it is necessary to examine the concerns underlying
the "secret agreement" protection afforded the FDIC and compare the
impact of fraudulent transferee liability on those concerns.
Beyond the traditional justification that FDIC protection in general
is necessary to protect the soundness of the nation's banking system,
434
two more specific concerns exist. The first is the FDIC's ability to per-
form its function as regulator;435 the second is the FDIC's ability to act
as insurer.4 36 As shown below, imposition of fraudulent transferee liabil-
ity impairs the FDIC's ability to function effectively in either role.4 "
1. The FDIC as regulator
Imposition of fraudulent transferee liability on the FDIC would im-
pede the FDIC's ability to perform its regulatory function. 3 8 For the
FDIC to effectively regulate banking, it must be able to accurately evalu-
FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1267 (6th Cir. 1985) (FDIC protected from defense of no
consideration); FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) (FDIC pro-
tected from defenses of waiver, estoppel and unjust enrichment); Gunter, 674 F.2d at 869
(FDIC protected from fraud defense); Chatham Ventures, Inc. v. FDIC, 651 F.2d 355, 361-62
(5th Cir. Unit B July 1981) (FDIC protected from oral joint venture agreement), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 972 (1982).
433. See FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1986) (tecognizing limits to
protection afforded to FDIC).
434. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 870 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
435. Id. at 871.
436. Id. at 871-72.
437. See infra notes 438-73 and accompanying text.
438. As regulator, the FDIC's Division of Bank Supervision supervises insured banks, en-
sures compliance with banking laws, oversees enforcement actions, reviews applications for
insurance, and reviews proposed mergers. FDIC, supra note 1, at 21. In its supervisorial role,
the FDIC conducts four types of examinations: safety and soundness; compliance with con-
sumer protection and civil rights laws; performance of fiduciary responsibilities in trust depart-
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ate banks' solvency. 39 A transfer of a property interest to a bank that a
trustee can later avoid will result in the FDIC overvaluing bank assets
and lead to erroneous solvency determinations.' 0 The Court in
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC"1 noted that "[t]he genuineness of as-
sets ostensibly held by a bank is certainly germane to a determination of
solvency."" 2 Fraudulent transferee liability would result in the FDIC
not being able to regulate in the most informed, and presumably most
efficient, manner." 3 Protection will allow the FDIC to rely on its own
valuations of the bank's assets in that the assets represented on a bank's
books would be those, theoretically at least, upon which the FDIC could
collect.4 " Thus, protecting the FDIC from fraudulent transfer liability
allows the FDIC to best perform its regulatory function.
Secret agreements affect the FDIC's ability to regulate effectively in
a manner similar to imposition of fraudulent transferee liability. Secret
agreements that do not appear in the bank's records have the effect of
overstating solvency as they are actually hidden restrictions on the
bank's ability to collect upon assets." 5 D'Oench, Duhme protection
eliminates any incentive to enter into secret agreements because the
agreements will be disregarded." 6 Further, any agreements that are en-
tered into will be unenforceable." 7 Thus, D'Oench, Duhme protection
results in more accurate valuation of assets, and enables the FDIC to
place more reliance on its valuations in making regulatory decisions.
This ability to evaluate a bank's assets accurately and rely on that valua-
ments; and adequacy of internal controls in electronic data processing. Id. at 3. The FDIC
conducted 3,751 safety and soundness examinations in 1988. Id. at 4.
439. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 870. Insolvency occurs when a bank's liabilities exceed its assets.
Burgee, supra note 53, at 1150. This usually manifests itself when the bank is unable to meet
the demands of depositors and other creditors. Id Solvency determinations are based on
examination reports prepared by bank examiners which analyze asset values and the bank's
liquidity position. Id.
440. See Gunter, 674 F.2d at 870.
441. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
442. Id. at 460.
443. Admittedly, though, refusal to impose such fraudulent transferee liability on the FDIC
will not discourage fraudulent transferors from their actions. The only remedy a trustee may
assert upon avoidance of a fraudulent transfer is recovery of the transferred property. 11
U.S.C. §§ 548, 550 (1988). Thus, the bankrupt debtor is not deterred from trying to transfer
property.
444. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 870.
445. See, eg., D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 454 (agreement not to call for payment on
note).
446. Id. at 459. For a discussion of the protection D'Oench, Duhme affords, see supra notes
62-87 and 232-81 and accompanying text.
447. D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 459.
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tion leads to better regulatory decisions. To this extent, enforceable se-
cret agreements and fraudulent transferee liability are similar.
2. The FDIC as insurer
A second distinct concern is the effect of fraudulent transferee liabil-
ity on the FDIC's ability to act as insurer. The core of the argument
against protecting the FDIC from fraudulent transferee liability is that
such liability does not affect the FDIC's role as insurer in the same way
as does allowing the enforcement of secret agreements. 48 This assumes
that the main function of the FDIC as insurer is to arrange purchase and
assumption transactions and that imposition of fraudulent transferee lia-
bility would not interfere with the FDIC's ability to do so.44 9 Two con-
siderations dictate the FDIC's success in implementing purchase and
assumption transactions: (1) the FDIC, by statute, must first determine
that the cost of a purchase and assumption transaction is less than the
cost of a liquidation;450 and, (2) the FDIC must be able to find a willing,
healthy bank to acquire the failed bank.451
448. The court in La Mancha Aire, Inc. v. FDIC (In re La Mancha Aire, Inc.), addressing a
trustee's claim that the debtor's grant of a security interest to a bank now in FDIC receivership
was a preference under the Bankruptcy Code noted:
The statute is designed to protect the FDIC both as insurer and as receiver from the
effect of secret agreements between an insured bank and its obligors. It resembles a
dead man's statute and serves much the same purpose. The only effect of the statute,
however, is to render certain secret agreements unenforceable against the FDIC. It
has no application to the facts here, where no one is attempting to enforce a secret
agreement against the FDIC.
41 Bankr. 647, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
449. There has been some criticism of the FDIC's willingness to arrange for purchase and
assumption transactions in the majority of cases, and of the deposit insurance system in gen-
eral. E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 46-47 (1985).
Critics charge that this preference "extends an implicit government blessing not only to unin-
sured deposits but also to nondeposit debt and to affiliated corporations of all sorts." Id. at 47.
This results in 100% de facto insurance and shifts the burden of risky investments from de-
posit institutions and their creditors to "the insurance system's implicit guarantors: the gen-
eral taxpayer and conservatively managed institutions able to survive whatever crisis might
unfold." Id. The recent savings and loan crisis shows that this is exactly what has happened,
with disastrous results. The legislative history of FIRREA notes:
As long as the federal government was responsible for picking up the tab for a failed
state-chartered thrift, there was no great incentive for many state legislatures to deny
the sweeping demands for additional investment powers made by the thrift industry
[following deregulation]. The results were tragic. [Seventy percent] of all FSLIC
expenditures during 1988 went to pay for problems created by high-risk, ill-super-
vised, state-chartered thrifts ....
H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 297, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 86, 93.
450. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c), (k) (1988). For a discussion of this mandate, see supra note 346
and accompanying text.
451. The larger the failed bank is, and the more restrictive the branching laws under which
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The court in Gunter v. Hutcheson452 held that allowing defendants
to assert unknown state-law fraud claims against the FDIC would dis-
rupt the purchase and assumption mechanism because the FDIC would
be unable to estimate its potential loss from a purchase and assumption
transaction and make the required statutory judgment.4 53 Imposition of
fraudulent transferee liability on the FDIC would similarly effect the
FDIC's ability to carry out purchase and assumption transactions. 54
The FDIC would be unable to evaluate accurately its liability in a
purchase and assumption transaction due to the possible existence of
avoidable fraudulent transfers.455
One commentator argued that the FDIC has much more latitude in
deciding whether to arrange a purchase and assumption transaction or a
liquidation than section 1823 would seem to allow.4 56 The FDIC does
it operates, the more difficult it is for the FDIC to find a willing purchaser. E. KANE, supra
note 449, at 48..
452. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
453. Id. at 870. In order to determine the cost of a purchase and assumption transaction,
the FDIC evaluates the bank's assets. Id. The Court in D'Oench, Duhme held that allowing
the enforcement of secret agreements makes it more difficult for the FDIC to value the assets
of a bank accurately. 315 U.S. at 460. Justice Jackson also emphasized that the FDIC could
accomplish its purposes only if it could rely on bank records. Id. at 472 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
454. The assumption that the presence of hidden defenses makes a purchase and assump-
tion transaction more expensive than a liquidation has been criticized on the basis that regard-
less of which option is chosen, the uncollectible asset still comes out of the insurance fund.
Note, supra note 5, at 282. While true, this reasoning would seem to validate the secret agree-
ment precluded in D'Oench, Duhme and lends support to the position that the FDIC should be
protected from all hidden defenses which, if allowed, would cause a loss to the insurance fund
due to an uncollectible asset.
Additionally, to accept this argument, one must conclude that the judgment called for by
the statute is unnecessary and therefore the FDIC is free to ignore it. As a consequence of
accepting this argument, the FDIC would be free to choose an option on any basis or no basis
at all. This is not the case. While the loss will eventually be borne by the insurance fund in
either case, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) states that the FDIC must know that this will be the
case at the time the FDIC is deciding how to handle the failed bank 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)
(1988). It cannot ignore this statutory mandate. If the FDIC is unaware of hidden defenses, it
will underestimate its potential liability, and implement a purchase and assumption when the
statute would otherwise require a liquidation of the failed bank. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 870.
Lastly, even if the only effect of these hidden defenses is to decrease the insurance fund,
that impact could hurt the FDIC's ability to act as insurer in ways other than simply foreclos-
ing the purchase and assumption option. For a discussion of the financial impact of fraudulent
transferee liability on the FDIC's ability to act as insurer, see infra notes 466-73 and accompa-
nying text.
455. The former chairman of the FDIC notes that "if the assets and contingent liabilities of
the closed bank are too ill-defined for the FDIC to make a reasonable estimate of the compara-
tive costs of an assumption versus a payoff," it may not enter into a purchase and assumption
transaction. Barnett, Horvitz & Silverberg, supra note 61, at 310.
456. E. KANE, supra note 449, at 46.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
not report the methods by which it estimates the costs of alternative ap-
proaches in sufficient detail to allow external critics to reproduce the al-
ternative estimates.45 7 It is further argued that if a strictly economic
accounting of the opportunity costs were actually being used by the
FDIC, liquidations would be more frequent.4"' Robert Barnett, former
chairman of the FDIC, noted the persuasiveness of the argument that
placing emphasis on cost in making the choice is not within the true
meaning of section 1823 .459 Barnett went on to emphasize that "there is
a great degree of flexibility in the cost-based analysis; sufficient flexibility,
in fact, that in most cases (not all) in which a [purchase and assumption]
transaction is deemed to be the best solution, it can be accomplished.""
Under this view, the possible existence of either secret agreements or
fraudulent transferee liability would not truly interfere with the FDIC's
exercise of its statutory judgment in deciding how to deal with a failed
bank.
The second consideration is whether secret agreements or possible
fraudulent transferee liability deter healthy banks from entering into
purchase and assumption transactions. A successor bank might be reluc-
tant to purchase a note at face value (or would demand a substantial
discount as is found in "whole-bank" purchase and assumptions46 ) if the
note were secretly unenforceable, thus diminishing the value of the
bank's assets.462 However, the purchasing bank is able to return to the
FDIC, under the terms of the purchase and assumption agreement, all
assets that were not of the highest banking quality.4 6 3 The FDIC, hold-
ing the "bad" asset, must sue on the note.4" Accordingly, fraudulent
transferee liability would neither disrupt the FDIC's ability to choose the
purchase and assumption mechanism, nor its ability to implement it.4 6
As shown above, an entirely plausible argument exists that neither
fraudulent transferee liability nor secret agreements hurt the FDIC's
ability to act as insurer. However, even if the FDIC's ability to perform
purchase and assumption transactions is unimpaired, another considera-
tion affecting its role as insurer may mandate protection. Both fraudu-
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Barnett, Horvitz, & Silverberg, supra note 61, at 310 n.5.
460. Id.
461. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
462. Portis, supra note 48, at 261 n.22.
463. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
464. Id.
465. The FDIC was able to arrange 164 purchase and assumption transactions in 1988.
FDIC, supra note 1, at 18.
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lent transferee liability and enforcement of secret agreements have
another-and more harmful-effect, the detrimental financial impact on
the insurance fund.
A financial impact on the FDIC, whether from fraudulent transfer
liability or the enforcement of a secret agreement, hurts the FDIC's abil-
ity to act as insurer.466 The FDIC's success as insurer depends on the
size of the insurance fund the FDIC maintains.4 6 7 In turn, the insurance
fund's size depends upon several factors, including the amount of insur-
ance premiums paid by member banks,46 the FDIC's ability to collect
from obligors of failed banks on assets the FDIC now holds,4 69 and the
FDIC's success in finding healthy banks willing to participate in
purchase and assumption transactions.4 70
Congressional legislation demonstrates that depletion of the insur-
ance fund is detrimental to important federal interests.471 Both fraudu-
466. Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Annunzio).
467. Obviously, deposit insurance only prevents runs on banks through its own solvency
and ability to pay claims. A shortage of deposit insurance funds could set off a nationwide run
on troubled banks, exhausting all insurance reserves. E. KANE, supra note 449, at 4. This
would be "politically disruptive" as Congress would have to do some "wild bureaucratic
scrambling" to decide how to make good on its guarantees. Id While theoretically the federal
government could just print more money, that alternative could damage the economy in other
ways. See generally R. BRYANT, CONTROLLING MONEY: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND ITS
CRrcs 109-12 (1983) (analyzing control of "money stock" as tool to achieve high employ-
ment, low inflation, and growth of GNP).
468. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(c) (1988). FIRREA has raised the insurance premiums for both the
Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings Association Insurance Fund. FIRREA, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 208(c), 103 Stat. 183, 208 (1989). The 1989 Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) rate was 8.3
cents for every 100 dollars of deposits. Id. In 1990 this rose to 12 cents and in 1991 it will rise
to 15 cents. Id. The 1989 Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) premium was 20.8
cents for every 100 dollars of deposits. Id. at 209. From 1991 to 1993 the SAIF premium will
rise to 23 cents. Id. There will then be a decrease for the next three years to 18 cents per 100
dollars. Id. After 1998, the SAIF rate will be the same as that of the BIF, 15 cents. Id. The
insurance premiums charged to member banks are passed on to depositors in the form of lower
paying interest rates on deposits and higher interest rates on loans.
469. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 865.
470. Id. If the FDIC is unable to find a willing bank, the FDIC must instead liquidate the
failed bank. Id. A liquidation entails large cash expenditures from the insurance fund to pay
off the bank's depositors, and is one of the reasons the FDIC favors purchase and assumption
transactions. Note, supra note 5, at 261. The FDIC estimates that it saved over $3 billion in
1988 by arranging purchase and assumption transactions instead of liquidations. FDIC, supra
note I, at 9. The larger the failed bank is, and the more restrictive the branching laws under
which it operates, the more difficult it is for the FDIC to find a willing purchaser. E. KANE,
supra note 449, at 48. For a discussion of the FDIC's options when faced with a failed bank,
see supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
471. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988). Congressional intent to protect the FDIC is evinced by
Congress' recent amendment of section 1823(e) to expand the section's coverage to the FDIC
as receiver. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 217, 103 Stat. 183, 256 (1989) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1271
lent transferee liability and enforcement of secret agreements deplete the
insurance fund 472 because the FDIC cannot collect upon the "bad" asset,
whether it is acquired through a liquidation or a purchase and assump-
tion transaction.47 3 It is in this manner that both affect the FDIC's abil-
ity to function as insurer.
IV. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION
The problem of FDIC fraudulent transferee liability may have a
simpler solution than expecting judges to interpret conflicting statutes
and policies correctly. A uniform rule, rather than a myriad of judicial
devices, is the best way to protect the FDIC. Congress has repeatedly
manifested its desire to protect the banking industry and the FDIC, as
evidenced most recently by the provisions of FIRREA.474 It is time for
Congress to speak again through clear and unambiguous legislation.
Congress codified the D'Oench, Duhme 47 doctrine in section
1823(e) of Title 12,476 thereby protecting the FDIC from certain state-
law defenses.47 7 Congress could similarly protect the FDIC from fraudu-
lent transferee liability by adopting the reasoning of the United States v.
472. Judge Posner recognizes that when a person defrauds a bank whose deposits are in-
sured by the FDIC, while some of the costs may be borne by stockholders, most will be borne
by the federal government. R. POSNER, supra note 133, at 601.
473. Note, supra note 5, at 282.
474. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). FIRREA includes many new regulatory
provisions. First, savings institutions must meet tough new capital requirements. The core
capital requirement is 3%. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. 304. The tangible capital requirement is 1.5%.
Id The intangible capital, including "goodwill," may not exceed a certain percentage of the
total assets as follows:
Prior to January 1, 1992 1.500%
January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992 1.000%
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993 0.750%
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1995 0.375%
Thereafter 0%
Id. S&Ls failing to meet the requirements will be subject to strict restrictions. Id. at 307-08.
Second, savings institutions must divest all junk bonds by July 1, 1994. Id. § 222, at 270.
Third, enforcement powers over officers and directors are broadened to include consultants,
joint venture partners, agents, independent contractors and others who deal with savings insti-
tutions. Id. § 901, at 446. Fourth, civil money penalties are authorized up to $1 million. Id.
§ 951, at 498. Fifth, criminal penalties up to thirty years imprisonment are authorized and the
statute of limitation for banking crimes is increased to ten years. Id. § 961, at 499. Sixth, the
notification requirement prior to terminating an institution's deposit insurance is shortened
from 120 to 30 days. Id. § 926, at 489-90. Finally, rewards for whistle-blowers are authorized
up to $100,000 or 25% of the assessed fine, whichever is less. Id. § 933, at 496.
475. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
476. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
477. See supra notes 88-104 and 282-306 and accompanying text.
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Kimbell Foods, Inc.478 line of cases479 and extending to the FDIC holder-
in-due-course status whenever the FDIC sues upon the assets of a failed
bank. Such congressional action would not only protect the FDIC from
state-law defenses not precluded by D'Oench, Duhme or section 1823(e),
but would also automatically bring the FDIC within the protection of
Bankruptcy Code section 550(b).480
V. CONCLUSION
As more and more financial institutions fail, the FDIC's importance
grows. Through passage of FIRREA, Congress has acted-at great cost
to taxpayers-to ensure the continued vitality of the United States bank-
ing system.4 81 Estimates of the cost of the federal bailout of the savings
and loan industry run anywhere from 50 billion482 to 500 billion dol-
lars.483 Given these staggering costs, failure to protect the FDIC from
fraudulent transferee liability could seriously undermine interests that
Congress has resolved to defend.
Perhaps the banking industry deserves no protection at all. Without
regulation, the market might provide both the incentives and balance the
banking industry so desperately needs. Perhaps banks that are managed
wisely and responsibly would succeed and those that are not would fail.
In that situation, depositors would have the same recourse available to
unsecured creditors when any other business fails.
This scenario, however, was not envisioned by Congress when it
originally established the FDIC, nor is it consistent with Congress' hopes
today.484 The recent passage of FIRREA leaves no room for judicial
uncertainty about congressional intent. The United States Supreme
478. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
479. See supra notes 105-25 and 308-52 and accompanying text.
480. Congress has authorized a study to determine the impact of the various state and fed-
eral bankruptcy exemptions on the insurance fund. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1001, 103
Stat. 183, 507-08 (1989). The study, to be conducted by the Secretary of the Treasury and
submitted to Congress within eighteen months of the passage of FIRREA, is to include the
feasibility of (1) uniform exemptions; (2) limits on exemptions when necessary to repay obliga-
tions owed to FDIC-insured depository institutions; and, (3) requiring borrowers from FDIC-
insured depository institutions to post a personal or corporate bond when obtaining a real
property mortgage. Id
481. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
482. Rosenblatt, Up to $100 Billion Extra Sought for S&L Rescues, L.A. Times, Nov. 1,
1989, at Al, col. 2.
483. Pine, Keating Predicts S&L Bailout Will Cost $500 Billion, L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1990,
at D2, col. 2.
484. See generally FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989); Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1811-32 (1988)).
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Court has long recognized the importance of the FDIC's role and the
Court continues to do so. 485 Until such time as Congress directly ad-
dresses the issue, the judiciary should not hesitate to protect the FDIC
from fraudulent transferee liability.
486
By William A. MacArthur*
485. See, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987) (FDIC protected by interpretation of
federal statute); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (FDIC protected by
federal common law).
486. One commentator notes that in drafting a statute, Congress takes into account the
issues that have been litigated during the preceding 20 or 25 years. G. GILMORE, THE AGES
OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977). Characteristically, as has happened with respect to the FDIC,
"the focus of litigation has a way of shifting unexpectedly and unpredictably. New issues,
which no one ever dreamed of, present themselves for decision." Id. When that happens,
"reformulation of an obsolete statutory provision is quite as legitimately within judicial compe-
tence as the reformulation of an obsolete common law rule." id. at 97.
* The author thanks Professors Daniel Schechter and Christopher May for their in-
sightful criticism and comments. Special thanks to Barbara Lichtig for her patience, support,
and encouragement.
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